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Accommodation via Understanding 




 Hans-Georg Gadamer is widely recognized as one of the most influential figures 
in twentieth century hermeneutics. Following Heidegger, Gadamer articulates the 
hermeneutical problem ontologically as the problem of human understanding, and argues 
that understanding is an inherently dialogical process that cannot be grasped by a facile 
appeal to method. While Truth and Method—his magnum opus—primarily focuses on 
the understanding of texts, his assertions regarding the historical and dialogical nature of 
understanding opens his work up to different types of application. This thesis will assert 
that his work provides an excellent framework for making sense of some of the 
challenges inherent in inter-cultural/religious dialogue and understanding, and 
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 1  
Introduction 
 
Why Gadamer, Why now? 
 
The current state of geopolitics in the second decade of the new millennium
1
 has 
engendered a renewed and somewhat urgent interest in inter-cultural/religious dialogue 
and understanding. It is in this context that the following claim by Charles Taylor rings 
true: “the great challenge of the coming century, for both politics and for social science, 
is that of understanding the other.”2 Reflecting on this quote fourteen years after its initial 
publication in 2002, the argument can be made that perhaps a slight reformulation of this 
sentiment is in order; that perhaps the “other” Taylor speaks of is best understood as “the 
religious other.”  
While a cursory glance at the Pew Research Center’s 2015 report on the future of 
world religions
3
 seems to confirm the common perception that religious affiliation is on 
the decline in most Western nations, a closer look indicates that the net impact of 
increasing global populations means that, “as a share of all people in the world, those 
with no religious affiliation are projected to decline from %16 in 2010 to %13 percent by 
the middle of the century.”4 This type of projection—combined with the present reality of 
                                                        
1
 Here I am primarily referring to the ongoing civil war in Syria and general instability throughout the 
Middle East, the ensuing ‘refugee crisis’ and the sluggish and inadequate response from the European 
Union and other global powers, the alarming rise of proto-fascist and anti-religious discourse in the wake of 
increasing numbers of refugees and acts of terrorism in the West, the return of Cold War tensions, and, on a 
broader and perhaps more abstract level, the general sense of global malaise caused by the feeling that, to 
quote Aharon Klieman, “international society is under siege” (V). From Great Powers and Geopolitics: 
International Affairs in a Rebalancing World ed. Aharon Klieman (Cham, Switzerland: Springer 
International Publishing Switzerland, 2015).  
2
 Taylor, Charles, “Gadamer on the Human Sciences,” in Gadamer’s Century: Essay’s in Honor of Hans-
Georg Gadamer, eds. Jeff Malpas, Ulrich Arnswald and Jens Kertscher (Cambridge, MA: MIT, 2002), 126.  
3




 2  
ever-increasing international migration
5—seems to support this reformulation of Taylor’s 
assertion, and thinking in these terms raises the very important question of what this 
challenging task of understanding actually entails.  
            Although the philosophy of Hans-Georg Gadamer may not be the first thing that 
comes to mind when thinking through a way to approach such a question, I hope to 
demonstrate that Gadamer’s life-long effort to articulate understanding as an ontological 
process, combined with his unique understanding of transcendence—and his insistence 
on the role it must play in “the task of philosophy today” 6 —provide indispensible 
resources in this regard. Within the vast body of existing Gadamerian scholarship this is 
certainly not a novel claim, and a number of noteworthy Gadamer scholars
7
 have made 
important strides in expounding the ways in which Gadamer’s thought can aid scholarly 
attempts to make sense of understanding across cultural and religious divides, and also in 
pointing out areas where his thought seems to fall short in this regard. For the most part, 
however, these efforts seem more exploratory than sustained, and there seems to be—at 
least in English language publications—an interesting lacuna: while many important 
theoretical discussions are occurring, there is a notable scarcity of attempts
 
to apply these 
insights to a case study to see how they could work to illuminate and/or mitigate some of 
the issues surrounding attempts at dialogue in a real-life intercultural or interreligious 
conflict.  
                                                        
5
 United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division (2016). International 
Migration Report 2015: Highlights (ST/ESA/SER.A/375).  
6
 Hans-Georg Gadamer, A Century of Philosophy: Hans-Georg Gadamer in Conversation with Riccardo 
Dottori, Trans. Rod Coltman and Sigrid Koepke (London: Continuum, 2004), 73.  
7
 See all bibliographic entries for Fred Dallmayr, David Tracy, Jens Zimmerman and Andrzej Wiercinski 
as a sampling of this discourse. 
 3  
This is a lacuna I find interesting for a number of reasons: (1) in his later years 
Gadamer was clear in his insistence that hermeneutics cannot be contained in some 
theoretical silo, but is, rather, something with intimately practical dimensions;
8
 (2) while 
the practical application of continental philosophy to case studies is not a typical 
operation in philosophical scholarship, the urgency of the current global social context 
demands—at least from the interdisciplinary standpoint of Religious Studies—that the 
practical application of all potentially viable paths to clarifying issues surrounding inter-
cultural/religious understanding be explored in earnest; (3) from the standpoint of 
hermeneutics itself and the historical considerations it puts forward, it is important to 
explore why the legacy of Gadamer has endured—in other words, why does Gadamer’s 
thought continue to address us as being significant today?  
It is with these considerations in mind that I approach the current undertaking, an 
examination of the ways in which Gadamer’s account of understanding can clarify and 
assuage some of the issues surrounding the Quebec accommodation crisis—a situation 
that arose in the early 2000s as media outlets in Quebec began heavily reporting on 
requests for religious accommodation in the province, which led to a widespread concern 
among sizable portions of the francophone majority regarding whether or not these 
requests (and the people making them) posed threats to certain fundamental pillars of 
Quebec society. The accommodation crisis brought longstanding and deeply-rooted 
issues related to cultural identity, social cohesion and pluralism to forefront of public 
debate, and prompted two successive provincial governments to try and take decisive 
steps to quell the resulting unrest. The primary documents to emerge from these 
                                                        
8
 See Gadamer, A Century of Philosophy; Hans-Georg Gadamer “Hermeneutics as Practical Philosophy” 
and “Hermeneutics as a Theoretical and Practical Task” in The Gadamer Reader: A Bouquet of Later 
Writings, ed. and trans. Richard E. Palmer (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 2007).  
 4  
government responses
9
 will form the basis of my case study, an analysis which will be 
structured around a careful explication of the areas of Gadamer’s thought that appear to 
be promising avenues for advancing successful intercultural and interreligious dialogue—
namely: his concept of effective history; his rehabilitation of prejudice and the authority 
of tradition; his insistence on the experiential and dialogical nature of understanding;
10
 
his assertion that this process follows the Platonic logic of question and answer; his 
concept of “the horizon” and “the fusion of horizons;” his understanding of 
transcendence as the “beyond” which represents the absolute limit of the knowing 
subject.  
These concepts are first introduced in Truth and Method
11—Gadamer’s magnum 
opus—and represent his attempt to decisively 12  disentangle hermeneutics from a 
fundamental presupposition of the Enlightenment, “namely that [the] methodologically 
disciplined use of reason can safeguard us from all error.”13 According to Gadamer this 
presupposition informs the interpretive stance of the natural sciences—which, in turn, 
informs the interpretive stance of the human sciences—and creates a rather unfortunate 
situation where truth is formulated as a thing that can be objectively grasped through 
correct methodology. Understanding based on method thus tends to position the 
                                                        
9 
The findings of the Bouchard-Taylor Commission and the now-shelved Quebec Charter of Values. 
10
 As we shall see in Chapter Two, Gadamer relates the dialogical and experiential nature of philosophical 
hermeneutics to the Aristotelian category of praxis, and, in doing so, makes the case that philosophical 
hermeneutics in fact continues the tradition of practical philosophy and therefore carries both ethical and 
political considerations (“Hermeneutics as Practical Philosophy,” 235). 
11
 Hans-Georg Gadamer, Truth and Method, trans. Joel Weinscheimer and Donald G. Marshal (London: 
Continuum, 2004).  
12
 As the discussion in the following chapter will demonstrate, although Dilthey and Schleiermacher before 
him had attempted this in their own way, both fell prey to romantic historicism, which, despite its critique 
of Enlightenment rationality, in fact shares the Enlightenment’s “prejudice against prejudice” (Truth and 
Method, 268-278), i.e. the belief that correct methodology can result in a unprejudiced interpretative stance. 
13
 Ibid, 279.  
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interpreter as a detached observer rather than a participant with something at stake.
14
 This 
is something Gadamer explicitly rejects, as positioning oneself in this way is to adopt the 
removed and supposedly unprejudiced stance of someone gathering empirical data. For 
Gadamer, scientific knowing is not (and can never be) synonymous with human 
understanding, as the latter always occurs in the middle of things: when we encounter a 
text or another person we enter into this encounter not as removed observers, but as 
embodied creatures who are always already shaped by our traditions (shared history, 
culture, beliefs, etc.), language, past experiences and accumulated knowledge. The 
fundamentality of this historical embeddedness allows Gadamer to put forward the notion 
of “historically effected consciousness;” the idea that human consciousness 
(understanding) is, inescapably, historically effected.  
Our historically effected consciousness forms the prejudices (pre-judgments) that 
we bring to all encounters with others, be they other texts or other people. It is one of 
Gadamer’s central arguments in Truth and Method that these prejudices must not be 
condemned or denied, but instead require a positive reassessment, as these prejudices are 
what form our horizon; the range of conceptual possibilities available from one’s own 
particular vantage point. When we enter into an encounter with a text or another person, 
understanding only occurs if we treat this encounter as a dialogical event we must 
surrender ourselves to. This requires us to risk allowing the horizon of the other text or 
person to enter into our own in an ongoing and dynamic process of question and answer. 
Risk is thus crucial here, as the event of understanding—the “fusion of horizons”15—only 
occurs when we are truly able to allow the Other’s horizon to enter into our own, a 
                                                        
14
 Stanley E. Porter and Jason Robinson, Hermeneutics: An Introduction to Interpretive Theory (Grand 
Rapids: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 2011), 78.  
15
 Gadamer, Truth and Method, 305.  
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process that Gadamer argues tests our prejudices and opens up new and unforeseen 
possibilities of meaning.
16
 In short, Gadamer’s philosophical hermeneutics offers an 
account of understanding that forces us to confront the issues at the very heart of 
intercultural and interreligious dialogue: the inescapable historical and linguistic 
embeddedness of human beings, the impossibility of objective understanding in human 
affairs and the need to come to terms with the implications stemming from the 
acknowledgement of our own finitude, and, perhaps most crucially, the role the 
experience of alterity plays in understandings of both self and other.  
In Chapter One I aim to sketch out the factors that contributed to Quebec’s 
accommodation crisis by fleshing out some important elements of the Quebec context. 
Here is where I will be inquiring into the conditions of possibility that led to the crisis, 
and, by examining two of the most consequential documents to emerge from this event—
the Quebec Charter of Values and Building the Future: A Time for Reconciliation
17—
outline two different ways the crisis has been perceived. I will argue that the concerns 
outlined by these different perceptions squarely positions inter-cultural/religious 
understanding (or a lack thereof) as the main issue underlying the debate over 
accommodation in the province. The analysis provided here will thus lay the groundwork 
for my subsequent exploration of the issue in Gadamerian terms.  
In Chapter Two I will provide an in-depth examination of Gadamer’s 
hermeneutics by focusing on the following questions: Where does Gadamer’s thought fit 
into the longstanding tradition of hermeneutical inquiry? What are the implications of his 
critique of scientific knowing and concurrent rejection of hermeneutics-as-methodology? 
                                                        
16
 This process will be discussed in detail in the following chapter. 
17
 The report detailing the findings of the Bouchard-Taylor Commission. 
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How does the dialogical model of human understanding offer insight into the possibilities 
and limits of human communication? In what ways are these insights furthered or 
complicated by his unique conceptualization of transcendence and argument regarding 
the role it has to play in facilitating inter-cultural/religious dialogue?
18
 And, finally, How 
can we understand his insistence that hermeneutics is “more than a mere teaching of a 
technique, and […] belongs in the neighborhood of practical philosophy”? 19  As the 
preceding remarks should indicate, my primary source for this chapter will be the work 
that cemented Gadamer’s philosophical importance, Truth and Method. This will be 
supplemented by a number of articles written throughout his long philosophical career, as 
well as a selection of the numerous interviews he gave in the years leading up to his death 
in 2002. The chapter will end with a short literature review to lay out some further 
theoretical considerations and contextualize my project within the larger body of existing 
Gadamerian scholarship on philosophical hermeneutics and inter-cultural/religious 
understanding.  
The third chapter is where I will seek to relate the hermeneutical framework 
explicated in Chapter Two to the accommodation crisis. By framing the central issue—
inter-cultural/religious understanding—in Gadamerian terms, I aim to demonstrate how 
certain aspects of Gadamer’s thought do indeed provide meaningful frameworks for 
exploring Quebec’s anxiety surrounding the intersections between religious expression, 
secularism, cultural identity, pluralism and ethnocultural integration. I will also outline 
                                                        
18
 Briefly summarized, he argues that transcendence describes a universal human experience, the 
experience of our own finitude. While religions define this experience in positive terms (their various 
dogmas),  he maintains that the base experience is universal and has an important role to play in facilitating 
inter-cultural/religious understanding. This aspect of his thought is rather difficult to grasp and carries some 
problematic connotations, and will be fleshed out in detail in Chapter Two.  
19
 Gadamer, “Hermeneutics as Practical Philosophy,” 235. 
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the shortcomings of his thought in this regard, and, drawing from some of the insights 
provided by my literature review, make the argument that the application of Gadamer’s 
thought to inter-cultural/religious understanding is ultimately limited by his failure to 
incorporate a greater concern for certain insights stemming from critical theory.  
 In concluding I will reflect upon the following question: Can Gadamer’s 
philosophical hermeneutics, all things considered, offer constructive suggestions for the 
issue of religious accommodation in Quebec? Here I will aim to provide an overview of 
the conclusions reached in the preceding chapters, and to clearly outline the insights 
gained from applying Gadamer’s hermeneutics to this issue. I will further reflect on the 
challenges of utilizing Gadamer’s hermeneutics in this way, and, building off the 
questions raised by the secondary sources consulted in chapter two, offer some 
suggestions for ways to incorporate a greater concern for the insights of critical theory
20
 
into future attempts to apply Gadamer’s hermeneutics to intercultural and interreligious 
dialogue.  
The mode of inquiry guiding my investigation will be one of philosophical 
exploration and analysis, and it will be pertinent to provide a few remarks on how this 
approach will inform the structure of my discussion. Philosophical hermeneutics 
demands a reframing of the way scholars in the social sciences approach the problems 
they encounter—it encourages us to ask, not “How can we use methodological rigor to 
understand consistently and accurately?” but rather, “How is understanding possible?” 
This reframing of the problematic acknowledges the inexhaustibly dialectical structure of 
                                                        
20
 I will specifically be looking at Paul Ricoeur.  
 9  
human knowledge,
21
 and encourages us to resist the temptation to reify our position as if 
we had full intellectual control over the issue at hand. It is important to note that 
Gadamer isn’t denying the applicability of the methods of the natural sciences to the 
social world,
22
 but rather is asking us to consider the ways in which understanding occurs 
“over and above our wanting and doing.”23  
As David Tracy notes in “Western Hermeneutics and Interreligious Dialogue,” 
most interreligious and intercultural dialogue does not strive to let the event of 
understanding unfold as Gadamer suggests, and are perhaps better described as 
“dialogical negotiations [which seek to] clarify the genuine differences and similarities of 
the official dialogue partners”24—no real risk is taken, no intellectual control ceded. It is 
little wonder that the results are often felt to be wanting. However, I maintain that by 
probing the question of understanding—by asking “how is understanding possible 
here?”—the door can be opened for a new type of dialogue, one which appreciates that 
successful accommodation requires something more akin to a dialogical event than a 






                                                        
21
 Gadamer, Truth and Method, 359. 
22
 Ibid, xxvii.    
23
 Ibid, xxvi. 
24
 David Tracy, “Western Hermeneutics and Interreligious Dialogue,” in Interreligious Hermeneutics, ed. 
Catherine Cornille and Christopher Conway (Eugene, OR: Cascade, 2010), 5.  
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Chapter I 
 
The Quebec Context: Anatomy of a Crisis 
 
Historical Antecedents 
Between 2006 and 2007 many Quebecers came to believe that requests for 
religious accommodation in the province had reached a point of “crisis.”  To get at the 
nature of this crisis it will be necessary to provide some historical context. Quebec is a 
small nation
25
 comprised of eight million inhabitants, the majority of whom are of 
French-Canadian ancestry
26
 and have a number of “distinctive characteristics” 27  in 
common: a rich natural,
28
 cultural, political, religious and linguistic heritage; a 
francophone identity and culture;
29
 shared institutions, sensibilities, and aspirations for 
the future.
30
 Despite enjoying majority status in Quebec, Quebecers of French-Canadian 
ancestry—who, following Gérard Bouchard, will henceforth be referred to as 
“Québécois”31—are indisputably a cultural and linguistic minority in the larger Canadian 
and North American context. This “majority-minority” 32  status has been a continual 
source of anxiety for the Québécois, who have long feared, and vehemently fought 
                                                        
25
 Quebec was officially recognized as a “nation within a united Canada” in the 39th Parliament, 1st session, 
vol. 141, no. 87 (27 November 2006). 
26
 As Gérard Bouchard notes in Interculturalism: A View From Quebec,” trans. Howard Scott (Toronto: 
University of Toronto Press, 2015), this demographic accounts for the majority population “in sixty-six of 
the seventy-five federal electoral districts in Quebec” (50).   
27
 Ibid, 10. 
28
 By “natural heritage” I am referring to the physical landmass of Quebec. 
29
 Following Bouchard I am referring to culture as, “all the symbols that, in a given collectivity, (family, 
community, nation, etc.), constitute the foundation of the social bond, on the one hand, and sustain all the 
components of identity on the other hand: perceptions of the self and others, affiliations, traditions, 
memory, rituals, values, beliefs, ideals, visions of the world.” (Interculturalism, 11). 
30
 Ibid, 10. The nature of these themes will be explored in much more detail in subsequent sections.  
31
 Ibid, 28.  
32
 Gérard Bouchard, “What is Interculturalism,” in McGill Law Journal 56, no. 2 (2011): 544, accessed 
October 12 , 2015, 10.7202/1002371ar. 
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against, cultural and linguistic assimilation into this vast English-speaking milieu. Since 
the latter half of the twentieth century this anxiety has been further compounded by the 
demographic shifts that accompany globalization—or, put differently, by the 
contemporary reality of pluralism.    
 The contemporary reality of pluralism refers, on one hand, to the existence of 
plurality—the presence of ethnic, cultural, religious and linguistic diversity within a 
society or state
33—and on the other, to a paradigm (pluralism) which holds that this 
diversity must be a) respected, and b) managed in a way that minimizes discrimination 
and fosters an equality of rights among citizens.
34
 While the anxiety surrounding the 
majority-minority status of Quebec has historically referred to Québécois fears over 
assimilation into English-speaking Canada, the contemporary reality of pluralism has 
heightened this anxiety by giving rise to the perception that the threat to the survival of 
their culture comes not only from English Canada and Canadian federalism, but also from 
the increasing presence of diverse and demographically significant groups of people with 
different languages, cultures, beliefs and values that all demand equal recognition.
35
 
While the term “anxiety” is often imbued with negative connotations, it will be important 
to note that the anxiety detailed above has expressed in a variety of ways throughout 
Quebec history, and cannot be portrayed as an inherently detrimental or productive force. 
It is simply a reality of Quebec society—a reality that is often implicit, but that can, under 
the right circumstances, come to be explicitly and vehemently communicated. 
                                                        
33
 "pluralism, n." OED Online. September 2016. Oxford University Press. 
http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/146193?redirectedFrom=pluralism (accessed October 09, 2016).  
34
 Bouchard, Interculturalism, 288. 
35
 I am here referring to Charles Taylor’s “principle of recognition;” this will be outlined in detail in 
Chapter II.  
 12  
 A momentous example of an explicitly communicated and socially constructive 
expression of this anxiety is the Quiet Revolution (La Révolution tranquille)—a sustained 
period of intense socio-political and economic change in Quebec that began in 1960 
when a newly elected Liberal government, led by Jean Lesage, took power. For the 
purpose of this discussion, however, the Quiet Revolution represents far more that a 
pertinent example: it is an aspect of Quebec history that must be addressed before 
examining the accommodation crisis. Why? Because this transformative facet of Quebec 
history (and its enduring legacy) represents the wellspring of many foundational elements 
of the modern Québécois social imaginary, and anxiety surrounding the survival and 
flourishing of this social imaginary is what is at the very heart of the Québécois belief 
that requests for religious and ethic accommodation within their society had reached a 
point of crisis.  
While the concept “social imaginary” has been conceptualized in various ways by 
different scholars, I believe Charles Taylor’s account to be the most appropriate for 
furthering the present discussion. According to Taylor, a social imaginary is the set of 
symbols, values, traditions, institutions, myths, etc. that, together, provide the social 
whole individuals’ understand themselves in reference to. It is the “symbolic cement”36 
that informs and legitimates collective understandings of what is normative and 
desirable—and what is not. As Taylor puts it, “[it is] the kind of common understanding 
which enables us to carry out the collective practices which make up our social life.”37 It 
will be important to note that a society’s social imaginary is not static, nor is it interpreted 
in exactly the same way by all members of the social group—it is a dynamic concept that, 
                                                        
36
 Bouchard, Interculturalism, 14. 
37
 Charles Taylor, A Secular Age (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2007), 173.  
 13  
while indeed rooted in deep symbolisms that stem from the experience of a shared 
history, undoubtedly changes over time as perceptions of this history change and new 
considerations are incorporated.
38
 In Gadamerian terms, the social imaginary of a group 
is its historically effected consciousness; the hermeneutical whole which informs 
individual and collective horizons of meaning. While the scope of this investigation will 
not allow for a detailed historiography of the Quiet Revolution,
39
 it will be necessary to 
outline the historical context of three vitally important principles that stem from this 
legacy and represent integral elements of the modern Québécois social imaginary: 
secularism, gender equality, and interculturalism.
40
  
Secularism and gender equality are perhaps the most cherished principles to 
emerge from the Quiet Revolution. Before this point in Quebec history the Roman 
Catholic Church was a ubiquitous force in Quebec society, and played a role in almost 
every aspect of daily life: not only did its Cathedrals and Churches represent formidable 
and pervasive aspects of the physical landscape, its values and norms pervaded social 
interactions and informed many important public and private institutions. Put differently, 
“the influence of the Catholic Church cannot be over-emphasized. Its control of 
education and the ability to influence the government’s social policies gave it decided 
                                                        
38
 For more on the dynamic nature of this concept see Gérard Bouchard and Charles Taylor, Building the 
Future: A Time for Reconciliation (Quebec: Quebec Official Publisher, 2008), 123.  
39
 For an interesting account of the different ways this history has been conceptualized over the last half 
century see Yves Bélanger, Robert Comeau et Céline Métivier, eds., La Révolution tranquille 40 ans plus 
tard : un bilan, (Montréal: VLB éditeur, 2000). 
40
 While many Québécois might not readily identify the principle of interculturalism as fundamental aspect 
of their collective identity (and may even reject this principle), Bouchard maintains that this is due to a 
failure on the part of the Quebec government to clearly define the term, and, in both Interculturalism 
(2015) and “What Is Interculturalism?” (2011), offers a sustained argument asserting that the term does in 
fact represent a cluster of principles that are integral to the modern Québécois social imaginary.  
 14  
influence over the lives of Quebecers.”41 Bouchard argues that this state of affairs led 
many Québécois to associate religion with “experiences of domination, of even 
oppression.”42 So, when the shifting social and political tides of the 1960’s brought about 
the definitive secularization of society, this was a move that many Québécois experienced 
as emancipatory.  
The association of secularism with feelings of emancipation was perhaps most 
acutely experienced by women, as the gender norms espoused by the Catholic Church 
meant that (pre-secularization) most Québécois women married and had children at a 
relatively young age, and did not have many opportunities to pursue a higher education or 
enter into the work force.
43
 It is thus no small coincidence that the contemporary 
principle of gender equality developed in conjunction with secularization. While the 
development of this highly cherished principle cannot be solely attributed to secularism 
and the waning influence of the Catholic Church,
44
 contemporary discourse—both 
scholarly and popular—on the relationship between these two principles demonstrates 
that they are closely interrelated in the Québécois social imaginary.
45
 The perception of 
secularism as a liberating force is therefore deeply ingrained in this small nation’s 
                                                        
41
 Catherine Krull and Frank Trovato, “Where Have All the Children Gone? Quebec’s Fertility Decline 
1941-1991,” in Canadian Studies in Population, 56 no. 1 (2003): 197.   
42
 Bouchard, Interculturalism, 13.  
43
 As Krull and Trovato note in “Where Have All the Children Gone?”, “[During] the period of 1961-1991, 
the percentage of women 20-24 years of age with a university education increased from 4.7 to 27 (Statistics 
Canada, 1991) […] [and] just as important, the number of employed married women still in their 
childbearing years rose from 15 percent in 1961 to 74 percent in 1991” (198-99). 
44
 It has also been noted that there is a strong link between the emergence of Quebec feminism and neo-
nationalism; as neo-nationalist sentiments emerged, Québécois women began to draw “parallels between 
the oppression of women and that of Quebec,” something the 1970’s feminist slogan “No liberation of 
Quebec without liberation for women; No liberation for women without liberation for Quebec” readily 
attests to. Quotes from Jill Vickers, “Feminists and Nationalism” in Gender, Race and Nation: A Global 
Perspective, ed. Jill Vickers and Vanaja Dhruvarajan (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2002), 248.  
45
 This will be explicitly demonstrated in my analysis of A Time for Reconciliation and the Charter of 
Values. 
 15  
imaginary, something clearly demonstrated by the fact that many Québécois express “an 
intense sensitivity to anything religious—a sensitivity that entails a great deal of 
suspicion and even hostility.”46  
 Interculturalism describes the principle underlying Quebec’s approach to 
managing ethnocultural and linguistic diversity. It has largely been understood as a 
response to, on the one hand, the new vision of Quebec articulated by neo-nationalists in 
the wake of the Quiet Revolution, and, on the other, the Canadian government’s policy of 
multiculturalism.
47
 Before the 1960’s Quebec society was marked by a state of 
longstanding inequality between its French majority and English-speaking minority. 
While the roots of this inequality can be traced back to the British conquest of New 
France—and the ensuing push to assimilate French Canadians into English-speaking 
society and minimize their political agency—in the twentieth century this inequality was 
further exacerbated by the uneven impacts of industrialization. As Leslie Laczko explains 
in Pluralism and Inequality in Quebec, the industrialization of Quebec was primarily led 
by “English-Canadian and American interests,”48 which 
produced a society characterized by sets of parallel but unequal institutions. The 
education level of Francophones was considerably below that of Anglophones. 
[…] Francophones were underrepresented in the most modern sectors of the 
economy, in managerial and professional occupations, and among high income 
earners. […] English was the dominant language of business and advancement.49  
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During this period expressions of nationalism were largely characterized by a “defensive, 
past-oriented”50 attitude that focused on surviving in this inhospitable environment by 
remaining firmly attached to a vision of Quebec as a Catholic, French-speaking, rural and 
agrarian society.
51
 By the mid 1950’s, however, two-thirds of the Quebec population 
resided in urban centers,
52
 a demographic shift which increased awareness
53
 of these 
social inequalities and effectively exposed traditional nationalism as being decidedly out 
of touch with the contemporary needs of the Québécois nation.  
 When the liberal party won the provincial election in 1960 and ushered in a period 
of intense socio-political and economic reform a new form of nationalism emerged, 
which “aimed at transforming Quebec into a modern, secular, French-speaking 
society.”54 This new nationalism, more accurately described as neo-nationalism,55 was 
future rather than past-oriented, and shifted the focus of its agenda from one of survival 
to one of development and emancipation. As Laczko explains, “this new ideology 
involved a shift from the long-held view of French-Canadians as a minority in the 
Canadian context to a new majority identity centered in Quebec.”56 While this paradigm 
shift was liberating, it also energized the majority-minority anxiety described above, 
because it drew renewed attention to the fact that Quebec—a province within the 
Canadian federation—had limited powers to effect all of the developmental changes its 
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majority desired.
57
 While some Quebec intellectuals and politicians saw the answer in 
amending the Canadian constitution so that it acknowledged the bicultural and bilingual 
nature of Canada (a move that would support Quebec’s quest for greater legislative 
autonomy),
58
 others argued that the goal of developing Quebec into a modern, French-
speaking, secular society required political (but not necessarily economic) independence 
from Canada. This latter position led to the development of a vocal sovereigntist 
movement and the creation of sovereigntist parties at both the provincial (Parti 
Québécois) and national (Bloc Québécois) levels.
59
 As Rocher states, “in sum, […] [t]he 
Quebec state looked to take into its own hands the economic and social development of 
Quebec through numerous policies that sought to confer a new status on French-
Canadians, who had been relegated for a long time to the inferior echelons of a society 
where they comprised the majority.”60 
 The fight for greater autonomy over the province’s social and economic 
development led, in the decades following the Quiet Revolution, to a number of 
important political milestones—the most pertinent for the discussion at hand being:  
[The] creation of a ministry of immigration (1968), rejection of Canadian 
multiculturalism (1971), adoption of a charter of human rights and freedoms 
(1975), establishment of French as the official language of Quebec (1974, 1977), 
development of a ‘cultural convergence’ policy (1978, 1981), the Chancy report 
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on intercultural education (1985), declaration of the government on interethnic 
and interracial relations (1986), enactment of a ‘moral contract’ policy (1990-
1991), Quebec-Ottawa agreement on responsibility for immigration (1991), 
orientation focusing on citizenship (late 1990s, early 2000s), a multidimensional 
approach that fully reintroduced the cultural dimension into government politics, 




While the scope of this historiography will not allow for a detailed account of this 
trajectory, it will be necessary to draw out a few important connections. 
 The policy of multiculturalism declares, as its “main postulate,” 62   that the 
Canadian nation is comprised of a mosaic of individuals and ethnocultural groups that are 
all equal before the eyes of the law.
63
 According to this policy, then, there is no “official” 
Canadian culture. As Bouchard explains it in Interculturalism, “[multiculturalism holds] 
in the name of diversity, raised to the rank of value and norm, [that] all citizens can 
affirm and express without constraint their identities and their differences, within the 
limitations of the law.”64 Although this policy has grown to be an integral part of English-
Canadian identity, it has nevertheless been rejected by all Quebec governments since its 
introduction, due to the firm conviction that “multiculturalism treats Quebeckers as just 
another cultural group in the Canadian cultural mosaic instead of a distinct society and a 
nation, which delegitimizes Quebec’s nation building policy.” 65  Put differently, the 
Quebec government’s stance on multiculturalism stems from the belief that 
multiculturalism fails to recognize and respond to Quebec’s unique majority-minority 
status and the linguistic and identity related anxieties that accompany it.  
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The Charter of the French Language (1977) and the principle of interculturalism, 
however, do specifically address these linguistic and identity-related anxieties. While the 
Charter of the French Language squarely established French as the official language of 
Quebec—the common language of public life—the principle of interculturalism, as 
Bouchard and Taylor argue, articulates an important shift in the Québécois social 
imaginary: its “ultimat[e] penetra[tion] by pluralism” 66  As noted, the paradigm of 
pluralism holds that social diversity must be respected and managed in a way that 
minimizes discrimination and fosters an equality of rights among citizens. The 
internalization of this paradigm is clearly reflected in Section 43 of the Quebec Charter 
of Rights and Freedoms (1975), which explicitly asserts that “persons belonging to ethnic 
minorities have a right to maintain and develop their own cultural interests with other 
members of their group.” 67  What interculturalism expresses, however, is the unique 
combination of pluralism with other elements of the Québécois imaginary, a combination 
which acts to address the linguistic and identity-related anxieties detailed above.  
Unlike the expression of pluralism articulated by multiculturalism, 
interculturalism is marked by a distinct “tension between two poles” 68—on the one hand, 
a desire to respect ethnocultural and religious diversity and an equality of rights among 
citizens, and, on the other, a desire to protect and propagate the culture, language and 
values of the Québécois majority.
69
 The result is an attitude towards ethnocultural and 
religious integration characterized by reciprocity: the host society has a duty to respect 
the diversity of immigrants, extend them equal rights, and support and facilitate their 
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successful social and economic integration, while immigrants have a responsibility to a) 
learn French, b) learn and respect Quebec’s laws, customs and values, c) fully participate 
in public life.
70
 It will be important to note that while the Quebec government has not 
officially adopted a policy of interculturalism in the same way the federal government 
has adopted a policy of multiculturalism,
71
 the term has recently begun being used in 
official government documents to describe its integration policy, and the general 
academic consensus is that “[a policy of] interculturalism can be distinguished through 
official documents and scholarship.”72 The principle of interculturalism can thus be seen 
to represent—albeit in various and sometimes ambiguous ways—a cluster of values 
integral to the Québécois social imaginary: pluralism, democracy, civic participation, the 
heritage of the Quiet Revolution, the inviolability of secularism, gender equality, the 
French language and culture. 
So, between 2006 and 2007 when media outlets in Quebec began heavily 
reporting on a number of requests
73
 for religious accommodation that, for many 
Québécois, appeared to threaten these core elements of their collective identity—or, put 
differently, to threaten the delicate balance struck between the two poles of tension 
described above—it is clear why a large segment of this population began to believe that 
they were facing a genuine crisis regarding ethnocultural and religious accommodation. 
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Some of the most high-profile and contentious cases reported were: The 2006 Supreme 
Court of Canada ruling that a Sikh boy, Gurbaj Sing Multani, be allowed to wear his 
kirpan
74
 to a public school in Montreal; a Montreal YMCA’s decision to honor a request 
made by the Yetev Lev Orthodox community to replace regular windows with frosted 
ones to obscure the sight of women exercising inside; the banning of an 11 year old girl 
from a soccer game for her refusal to remove her hijab.
75
 The infamous “Life Standards” 
charter adopted by the Hérouxville town council in January 2007
76
 in response to such 
reports thoroughly invigorated the debate, and has been pinpointed by some observers
77
 
as a true turning point—that is to say, after this event government intervention on the 
issue was inevitable. In 2007 Jean Charest’s Liberal government (2003-2012) established 
the “Consultation Commission on Accommodation Practices Related to Cultural 
Differences,” or, as it is more commonly referred to, the Bouchard-Taylor Commission. 
The incoming Parti Québécois government (2012-2014) headed by Pauline Marois took a 
different approach, and in 2013 proposed the Quebec Charter of Values, a controversial
78
 
bill that sought to create a clearer legal framework for dealing with issues related to 
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accommodation. These responses frame the accommodation crisis in two very different 
ways, and by examining the different concerns outlined by each I aim to propose that the 
primary issue underlying the crisis was not, as it ostensibly seemed, policies surrounding 
“intercultural harmonization practices” (see below), but rather dialogical understanding—
or a lack thereof. 
 
The Bouchard-Taylor Commission  
 
The mandate of the Consultation Commission on Accommodation Practices 
Related to Cultural Differences was to: “a) take stock of accommodation practices in 
Quebec; b) analyze the attendant issues bearing in mind the experience of other societies; 
c) conduct an extensive consultation on this topic; and d) formulate recommendations to 
the government to ensure that accommodation practices conform to Quebec’s values as a 
pluralistic, democratic, egalitarian society.”79  It will be necessary to note that the phrase 
“accommodation practices” should be understood as being synonymous with what I’ve 
referred to as “intercultural harmonization practices” above. In a broad sense, both 
describe the compromises and adjustments necessitated by the contemporary reality of 
pluralism and the respect for diversity it enshrines. More specifically, accommodation/ 
harmonization practices are practices which aim to “sett[le] difficulties and 
misunderstandings that arise through the encounter of different cultures. [They are] 
measures […] adopted in favor of individuals or minority groups threatened with 
discrimination because of their culture (including religion).” 80  The two prominent 
Quebec scholars charged with heading the commission, Gérard Bouchard and Charles 
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Taylor, explain in their final report that they choose to interpret this mandate in the 
broadest sense possible to “grasp the problem at its source and from all angles.”81  
This broad interpretation of the commission mandate was quite comprehensive, 
and resulted in: 13 research projects carried out by specialists from Quebec universities; 
31 focus groups with individuals from different milieus in Montreal and the regions; 59 
meetings with experts and representatives of sociocultural organizations; the 
establishment of an advisory committee comprised of 15 specialists from various 
disciplines; the creation of a website to foster public exchanges (the site was accessed 
over 400,000 times); public consultations.
82
 These public consultations took on two 
forms. The first was an appeal to members of the public to a) submit briefs on the issue 
(900 were received total) and b) to provide further “testimony” regarding these briefs at 
one of 328 hearings (241 individuals obliged).
83
 The second was the organization of 22 
televised citizens forums—“open without restriction to the public”—where a total of 
3,423 participants “from all social backgrounds” were allowed to take the floor and 
publically express their opinions.
84
 The findings of the commission are contained in an 
equally exhaustive report entitled Building the Future: A Time for Reconciliation.  
 
Building the Future: A Time for Reconciliation 
 
Due to the report’s extremely broad scope it will be beyond the purview of the 
present investigation to attempt to provide a substantive summary of the commission’s 
findings and/or Bouchard and Taylor’s analysis. Instead I aim to offer a focused 
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discussion on the factors Bouchard and Taylor pinpoint as representing the conditions of 
possibility that led to the crisis—in other words, I aim to focus on the issues that seem to 
have been hindering or preventing intercultural understanding in the Quebec context 
during this period. According to Bouchard and Taylor the accommodation crisis was 
not—as the media tended to present it—a crisis that involving a genuine or dramatic 
spike in requests for religious accommodation, nor was it a crisis involving the ability of 
public or private institutions to deal with the relatively small number of requests that 
actually came before them.
85
 As their findings demonstrate, it was rather a “crisis of 
perception”86 regarding the public’s view of harmonization practices which—fuelled by 
the controversial angle of much of the media’s reporting on the issue 87—led many 
members of the public to believe that such practices (and the people they accommodate) 
posed threats to “the foundations of collective life in Quebec.”88  
Bouchard and Taylor argue that, despite the undisputable role the media did play, 
the root cause of this belief cannot be solely attributed to its tendency to present these 
requests in controversial or misleading ways.
89
 As they state, “it was certainly amplified 
by media coverage, but we cannot explain solely in this way the astonishing reaction 
observed in the public […] From this we must infer that favorable conditions existed and 
that the situation was riven with insecurity, lack of understanding and even 
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exasperation.” 90  These “favorable conditions” refer to a series of complex and 
interrelated factors: the “majority-minority” anxieties detailed above, misunderstandings 
regarding the concepts of secularism and interculturalism, the presence (however small) 
of ethnism, racism, xenophobia and a general distrust of the Other—all of which 
combined to discourage intercultural dialogue and understanding, and thus 
interculturalism’s “dream of a closely integrated society.”91  
Bouchard and Taylor are quick to point out that not only was the public “hardly 
aware of the notion of accommodation and its various dimensions”92 when the media got 
hold of the issue, there were also “striking distortions between general public perceptions 
and the actual facts as we were able to constitute them.” 93  These distortions, by 
“emphasizing stereotypes, kindling emotionalism […] and encouraging xenophobia,”94 
thus played into and inflamed the majority’s anxiety surrounding the survival and 
flourishing of their social imaginary. While Bouchard and Taylor are careful to note that 
the evidence they gathered does not support the idea that negative responses to 
accommodation are unique to the Québécois majority,
95
 they do acknowledge that public 
debate over the issue was “largely dominated”96 by this demographic, and that: 
The so-called wave of accommodation clearly touched a number of emotional 
chords among French-Canadian Quebecers in such a way that requests for 
religious adjustments have spawned fears over the most valuable heritage of the 
Quiet Revolution, in particular gender equality and secularism. The result has 
been an identity counter-reaction movement that has expressed itself through the 
rejection of harmonization practices. Among some Quebecers, this counter-
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reaction targets immigrants, who have become, to some extent, scapegoats. What 
has just happened in Quebec gives the impression of a face-off between two 
minority groups, each of which is asking the other to accommodate it. The 
members of the ethnocultural majority are afraid of being swamped by fragile 




This situation, in turn, was further compounded by widespread misunderstandings 
regarding secularism and interculturalism.  
As the “main fears and dissatisfaction voiced by Quebecers concerned 
accommodation for religious reasons,”98 Bouchard and Taylor set out to explore some of 
the common misconceptions surrounding the open model of secularism Quebec has 
historically followed.
99
 As their public consultations revealed, many Quebecers 
understood secularism in reference to deceptively straightforward formulas such as “the 
separation of Church and State, State neutrality, [or] the confinement of religious practice 
to the private sphere.” 100  While any secular system must indeed achieve a balance 
between a) the legal and moral equality of all persons, b) freedom of conscience and 
religion, c) the separation of Church and State, and d) state neutrality regarding 
religion,
101
 “secularism models vary to different degrees from one context to the next,”102 
and therefore cannot  be reduced to any one simple formula.  
The tendency to do this, Bouchard and Taylor note, has led to a number of 
unfavorable perceptions: the idea that the requirement of neutrality refers not only to 
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institutions but also individuals (which would confine religion “within the strict limits of 
the home and places of worship”103); the idea that accommodating religious requests in a 
secular society is “according religious choice unacceptable preferential treatment in 
relation to other personal choices;”104 the idea that, because religion can be a source of 
oppression and inequality, restrictive models of secularism are patently preferable;
105
 the 
belief that, according to secularism, socially acceptable religious belief is only that which 
“fairly readily harmonizes with individual freedom and autonomy,”106 and, by extension, 
that religious orthodoxy demonstrates a refusal to integrate; the idea that religion is not a 
right (a positive duty) but a freedom (a negative duty)—in other words, while the state 
shouldn’t interfere with exercising this freedom, it shouldn’t be obligated to take positive 
steps to remove all obstacles to enjoying this freedom. 
107
 Finally, they note the presence 
of a tension between these understandings of secularism and the desire to maintain 
various public displays of Quebec’s Catholic heritage: “A number of Quebecers do not 
understand why accommodation must be granted to individuals belonging to minority 
religious groups while the majority must accept in the name of secularism the 
modification of certain of its symbols and institutional practices.” 108  According to 
Bouchard and Taylor, these perceptions of secularism are closely related to a number of 
unsympathetic beliefs about the viability and/or desirability of interculturalism.  
 In Interculturalism: A View from Quebec, Bouchard devotes a whole chapter to 
this theme, and incorporates the main insights gleaned from the commission into a much 
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more streamlined and focused discussion on the issue than can be found in Building the 
Future: A Time for Reconciliation. For this reason I will primarily be relying on this work 
rather than the final report in addressing this aspect of the crisis. As Bouchard notes at the 
beginning of the chapter, while the commission’s public consultations made it clear that 
Quebecers—“almost unanimous[ly]” 109 —prefer interculturalism to multiculturalism, 
some members of the majority nevertheless maintained a number of negative beliefs 
about interculturalism. Bouchard differentiates between two different strands of discourse 
in this chapter: 1) erroneous perceptions of interculturalism rooted in cultural anxieties, 
and 2) criticisms of interculturalism rooted in civic or legal concerns. In keeping with the 
delimitations of my own discussion, however, only the culturally rooted misconceptions 
that further the present inquiry will be addressed.  
 First is the idea that interculturalism’s interpretation of pluralism promotes a 
harmful cultural relativism that increases social fragmentation and therefore undermines 
the majority’s “values, identity, memory, language.”110 Related to this is the belief that 
interculturalism—primarily through its acceptance of the principle of recognition111 and 
its policies regarding accommodation—affords minority groups special privileges while 
not offering much in return to the majority.
112
 Third is the belief that the promotion of a 
shared culture will “will smother the founding culture,”113 by irreparably altering it.114 
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Finally, some members of the majority expressed the belief that, due to these 
deficiencies, “Quebec should apply a policy of long-term assimilation aimed at blending 
immigrants and minorities into the majority culture.”115   
As some of these beliefs about secularism and interculturalism reveal, the 
commission’s public consultations often “broke with political correctness and 
gobbledygook and  […] spurned taboos”116—an atmosphere which provided valuable 
insight into the way “a broad sampling of the population”117 viewed the crisis, and, by 
extension, one another. Bouchard and Taylor emphasize that these forums were open to 
all members of the public, “without restriction,” 118  which provided an important 
opportunity for members of the majority and members of various minority groups to 
express themselves and hear one another out. As was to be expected,
119
 these forums did 
reveal the presence of ethnism, xenophobia, racism and a general distrust of the Other, 
among other harmful (but less extreme) prejudices and stereotypes.
120
 Bouchard and 
Taylor are careful to emphasize that the statistical analysis of the forum transcripts—
“prepared by external researchers”121—revealed that such sentiments were a minority122  
and “were more a reflection of a lack of information than genuine malice.”123 However, 
the presence of such sentiments must be highlighted here, as they represent an important 
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obstacle to intercultural dialogue and understanding that, as will be demonstrated in 
subsequent chapters, poses a particular challenge to Gadamer’s hermeneutics.   
According to Bouchard and Taylor’s framing of things, then, the accommodation 
crisis can indeed be viewed as a symptom of a problem much more deeply rooted than a 
simple policy failure regarding accommodation—it is a symptom of a lack of 
intercultural dialogue and understanding. As they present it, the factors preventing 
understanding from occurring in this context are related primarily to issues of identity, 
self-understanding, and understanding of the Other. I will now turn to the Quebec Charter 
of Values, a bill which represents a response to the accommodation crisis that opened the 
Parti Québécois up to charges of increasing divisiveness between the Québécois majority 
and Quebec’s various ethnocultural and religious minorities, furthering anti-immigrant 
sentiments, and breaking with the principle of pluralism.
124
 It is a response that thus 
highlights many of the issues pinpointed in the preceding discussion as hindering 
intercultural dialogue and understanding, but from a different perspective.   
 
The Quebec Charter of Values 
 
 In September 2013, the Parti Québécois introduced the Quebec Charter of Values 
(Bill 60), the purpose of which, as defined in the explanatory notes, “is to establish a 
Charter affirming the values of State secularism and religious neutrality and of equality 
between women and men, and provid[e] a framework for accommodation requests.”125 
While the introduction of this bill was indeed in response to the accommodation crisis, it 
can also be seen as a response to the Bouchard-Taylor Commission, as the Parti 
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Québécois argued that the commission did not adequately address Quebecers’ concerns 
regarding the (purported) negative impacts of religious accommodation on Quebec 
identity.
126
 It should be noted that here, “accommodation requests” specifically refers to 
requests for reasonable accommodation, which must be differentiated from 
harmonization practices in general—while reasonable accommodation is indeed a type of 
harmonization practice, it refers to a specific category of requests that will be detailed 
shortly. Although the language used above to describe the bill’s intent doesn’t come 
across as very controversial, the specific ways in which the bill proposed accomplishing 
these tasks were cause for controversy. As Bouchard lays it out in Interculturalism: “The 
proposed charter announced on 10 September 2013 had three components: first, an 
official definition of the principles of a secular regime for Quebec […]; second, changes 
in the practice of religious and cultural accommodations; and third, a requirement that 
government employees (including those in government-run agencies) no longer wear 
religious symbols to work.”127  The first component, clarifying the values of Quebec 
secularism, was actually one of the final recommendations given by Bouchard and Taylor 
in Building the Future: A Time for Reconciliation, and did not cause much argument or 
debate among the general public, politicians or academics. The last two, however, were 
viewed as highly contentious by many, and as Bouchard asserts, reveals “an area of 
profound misunderstanding among the population.”128  
According to the Charter’s framing of things, religious accommodations act to 
violate certain rights laid out in the Quebec Charter of Human Rights and Freedoms, 
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specifically those relating to a woman’s right to gender equality. To understand this 
“profound misunderstanding” it will be necessary to provide some explanatory notes on 
the notion of reasonable accommodation. The notion of reasonable accommodation 
represents the legal framework for remedying instances of discrimination that stem from 
the “application of a norm or an otherwise legitimate statute […] [that] can adversely 
affect an individual or a category of people who display a trait for which the statue or 
norm makes no provision.”129 In other words, it is meant to protect minority rights against 
the various forms of discrimination that can arise from the fact that legislation is never 
truly neutral as it is drafted with the concerns of the majority in mind.
130
  In Quebec, 
citizens making requests for reasonable accommodation must have evidence that the 
discrimination they face is recognized by the Quebec Charter of Human Rights and 
Freedoms.
131
 As Bouchard and Taylor explain it, there are thirteen types of 
discrimination recognized by the charter as justifying an accommodation request.
132
 
These types of discrimination can be loosely categorized under three different headings: 
circumstantial discrimination (discrimination based on things like marital or pregnancy 
status), discrimination based on permanent traits (discrimination based on sexuality, 
gender identity or expression,
133
 skin color, disability, etc.), discrimination based on 
sociocultural traits (discrimination based on one’s religion, socioeconomic status, 
etc.).
134
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 To acknowledge the fluidity of sexuality and gender, I would like to assert a differentiation between 
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expression) and immutable permanent traits (skin colour, different forms of disability).  
134
 Bouchard and Taylor, A Time for Reconciliation, 63. 
 33  
If this requirement has been met there is still one more hurdle to overcome before 
being granted accommodation: “the duty of accommodation is limited by the realism of 
the request, i.e. by the ability of the organization to accommodate. The notion of undue 
hardship is decisive in this instance […] in other words, the duty of accommodation must 
be assessed in relation to the weight of inconvenience.”135 If, for, example, a request for 
reasonable accommodation requires an unreasonable financial expenditure, is likely to 
have a negative impact on an organization’s operations or safety, or, furthermore, would 
infringe on the rights of others, the request may be denied on the ground of undue 
hardship.
136
 According to Bouchard, with all these measures already in place, the PQ’s 
suggested amendments demonstrate their misunderstanding of the principle and practice. 
These amendments are as follows: “the accommodation request is consistent with the 
right for equality between women and men;” “the accommodation is reasonable in that it 
does not impose undue hardship on the public body with regard to, among other 
considerations, the rights of others, public health and safety, the effects on the proper 
operation of the public body, and the costs involved;” “the accommodation requested 
does not compromise the separation of religions and State or the religious neutrality and 
secular nature of the state”137  
As the existing legislation governing reasonable accommodation already 
accounted for these concerns under the notion of undue hardship—albeit with less 
explicit language—the addition of these clauses thus seems superfluous, and appears to 
assert that existing legislation had allowed religious accommodation requests to infringe 
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on gender equality and the other issues outlined above, when in fact it hadn’t. This, in 
turn, acted to increase the perception that religious “Others” were trying to utilize the 
principle of reasonable accommodation to gain special privileges and infringe on the 
rights and values of the majority, when, according to the findings of the Bouchard-Taylor 
Commission, this was decidedly not the case.
138
 
The third component of the charter, which imposes a restriction on wearing 
religious symbols to work in public institutions, is based on a restrictive understanding of 
secularism that goes against the model of open secularism that Quebec has followed since 
the Quiet Revolution. Furthermore, as this component of the charter dedicates a whole 
chapter to the “obligation to have the face uncovered” 139 —not only for personnel 
members working for public bodies but also members of the public accessing certain 
public services
140—it seems to betray a special concern or apprehension regarding the 
Muslim faith in particular. Ironically, then, in the name of protecting gender equality, this 
provision would act to deny some Muslim women not only the ability to work in public 
institutions, but also the ability to receive certain public services. As Bouchard notes, 
these positions are problematic on a number of fronts: the perceived social benefits of the 
charter do not outweigh the negative impacts on significant segments of the 
population;
141
 the understanding of state neutrality it puts forward is flawed (“it has never 
been demonstrated that this rule [state neutrality] would be broken by the wearing of 
                                                        
138
 Bouchard and Taylor, A Time for Reconciliation, 63. 
139
 Bill 60, Division II, Chapter III. 
140
 “personnel members of a public body must exercise their functions with their face uncovered, and 
persons to whom they provide services must also have their face uncovered when receiving such services” 
(Bill 60, Explanatory Notes. Emphasis mine).  
141
 Bouchard, Interculturalism, 151. 
 35  
religious symbols”142); the ban would increase divisiveness and fragmentation between 
the majority and minority groups rather than cohesion and integration; and, finally, “as 
hard as it is to believe, it has now been confirmed that the government conducted no 
research whatsoever prior to engaging in this major initiative. In other words, it intended 
to legislate on matters of which it had very little knowledge.”143 It will be important to 
note that these problematic aspects of the charter were not only noted by intellectuals 
such as Bouchard—all opposition parties in the National Assembly rejected the charter, 




One of the central recommendations proposed by the Bouchard-Taylor 
Commission was to focus on promoting harmonization practices that act to strengthen 
interculturalism’s model of integration through interaction; “to move forward [and] build 
a common identity, with common values and one inclusive collective memory.”145 This 
frames the accommodation crisis as an opportunity for self-reflection and an invitation to 
engage and begin dialogues with minority groups. The Charter on the other hand, appears 
to side with the media’s framing of the accommodation crisis, and takes a number of 
defensive steps to provide solutions for problems that haven’t been demonstrated to truly 
be present.
146—as the Bouchard Taylor commission exhaustively demonstrated, “the 
foundations of collective life in Quebec are not in a critical situation.”147  Despite their 
clear differences, both of these responses squarely frame the accommodation crisis as 
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being rife with a lack of intercultural dialogue and understanding. The challenges to 
intercultural understanding that have been brought to light through the investigation of 
these documents are manifold, and I will now turn to the work of Gadamer to explore 
whether or not philosophical hermeneutics seems able to illuminate and/or mitigate some 
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 Chapter II 
 
Laying the Groundwork: 
Gadamer’s Philosophical Hermeneutics Explained 
 
Like most ideas that have managed to occupy a privileged place in the Western 
intellectual tradition, the concept of hermeneutics can be traced back to “a family of 
ancient Greek terms: “hermêneuein or hermêneusai and hermêneia to designate an 
activity, hermênês to designate the individual who carries out this activity, and 
hermêneutikê to designate a particular discipline associated with this activity.”148 While 
there is some debate in existing scholarship over the precise translations of these 
cognates,
149
 there is wide consensus that “the various forms of the word suggest the 
process of brining a thing from unintelligibility to understanding.”150 This consensus is 
largely rooted in the terms’ relationship to the messenger-god Hermes, who was tasked 
with communicating messages from Olympus in a way that made them intelligible to 
humans. As the limited capacities of Hermes’ human audience would have barred them 
from understanding direct transliterations, Hermes was required to act as an interpretive 
intermediary
151—hence the commonplace understanding of hermeneutics as “the art or 
science of interpretation.” 152  As this etymology suggests, mediation, language, 
interpretation and understanding have long been at the center of hermeneutics. What has 
changed over the ensuing centuries is the way these themes have themselves been 
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interpreted and understood.  
Contextualizing Gadamer in the Hermeneutical Tradition  
 
Prior to the twentieth century and the pioneering work of both Martin Heidegger 
and Hans-Georg Gadamer, hermeneutics was commonly understood in epistemological 
terms,  as “any systematic approach to the questions of interpretation as those questions 
might arise in some particular domain.”153 For a large portion of Western thought the 
“domain” in question was predominately theology, and the hermeneutical task one of 
biblical interpretation. Early biblical hermeneuts were interested in uncovering the ways 
in which correct technique could establish ‘correct’ understanding—i.e. understanding 
that truly reflected what the author (and, by extension, The Author) really meant. The 
conceptual link between correct technique and correct understanding was further 
bolstered by the watershed event of the European Enlightenment, which engendered an 
intense concern with language and history (in the form of classical philology) and 
rational thought. According to the history of modern hermeneutics provided by Richard 
E. Palmer in his seminal work Hermeneutics, the cohabitation of these two stands of 
Enlightenment thinking—philology and rationalism—“had a profound effect on biblical 
hermeneutics,”154 forcing, for the first time, critical and historical considerations that had 
formerly been neglected.  
While the rationalist orientation of the Enlightenment took issue with the way 
biblical interpreters utilized Christian dogma—not reason—as an interpretive framework 
for articulating biblical truths, classical philology revealed that not only was the bible a 
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historical text, but that the understanding of all historical texts, “involve[s] a rediscovery: 
a rediscovery of something that was not absolutely unknown, but whose meaning had 
become alien and inaccessible.”155 These developments led to the normalization of the 
belief that structured appeals to reason and historical considerations were indispensible 
factors for successful interpretation, and also to the acknowledgement that the methods of 
interpretation utilized in biblical hermeneutics could also be extended to “secular”156 
theories of interpretation—developments which opened the door to the possibility of a 
general hermeneutics not specific to a particular discipline. Although traditional 
hermeneutical scholarship tends to credit Friedrich Schleiermacher, a Romantic thinker, 





 acknowledges that the seeds of this project were 
planted much earlier, in the writings of a number of different Enlightenment thinkers:  
Hermeneutic luminaries [such as] Joseph Konrad Dannhauer (1603-66), Christian 
Wolff (1679-1754), Johann Martin Chladni (a.k.a. Chladenius) (1710-59), and 
George Friedrich Meier (1718-77) took inspiration from the universalist 
rationalism of Leibniz in seeking a hermeneutica generalis predicated on 
scientific principles of demonstrable logic.
159
 
As Gadamer contextualizes his own project as a critical reevaluation of the understanding 
of hermeneutics-as-method—an understanding reified by the rationalism of the 
Enlightenment and reconceptualized by the historicism of the Romantics—it will be 
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pertinent to briefly sketch out the dominant trends in Enlightenment and Romantic 
thinking that led to the development of a general hermeneutics. 
 A major preoccupation of the Enlightenment was “the programme [of] removing 
prejudice, ignorance and superstition from the world and making it a rational place.”160 
Enlightenment thinkers sought to increase intellectual certitude through applied logic—
the modus operandi of the Enlightened rational subject—and, to speak in very general 
terms, viewed hermeneutics as “the science of the rules” governing the accurate 
interpretation of different types of texts.
161
 Early Enlightenment thinkers like Christian 
Wolff understood science as that which is demonstrably true, and thus viewed 
demonstration as representing the dividing line between knowledge and belief.
162
  These 
developments seemed to position hermeneutics as a “part of logic,”163 which lead to 
serious questions regarding whether or not the application of logic was a dynamic enough 




While Wolff maintained that these types of texts could only produce belief and 
not knowledge—as the types of truths contained therein were not scientifically 
demonstrable—many of his peers, such as John Martin Chladenius and Georg Friedrich 
Meier, took issue with this, and strove to develop “the basic principles for a general 
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hermeneutics, that is, those necessary for the interpretation of all texts.”165 While these 
early efforts resulted in a number of different general hermeneutical theories, three 
common developments planted the seeds from which Romantic hermeneutics would 
grow—namely, the belief that the key to understanding non-scientific texts lay in 
grasping authorial intent, the idea that texts had to be understood according to “the 
conditions of [their] time,”166 and, finally, the acknowledgement that different disciplines 
may indeed require different ideals of certitude.
167
 Despite the latter acknowledgement 
the conceptual link between hermeneutics and the logic of the natural sciences remained 
strong in Enlightenment thinking, and this is something the Romantics sought to revisit.  
Romanticism has largely been viewed in reactionary terms, as a movement 
focused on responding to and ultimately rejecting the intense rationalism of the 
Enlightenment—as Gadamer argues in Truth and Method, the period’s ethos is rooted in 
the effort to “revers[e] the Enlightenment’s criteria of value.”168 One of the great insights 
of Romantic hermeneutics—perhaps the great insight—is the idea that underneath the 
problem of interpreting specific texts lies a much broader problem: that of human 
understanding in general.
169
 Romantic thinkers viewed this problem epistemologically, 
and thus sought to formulate “principles or laws of understanding that [could] transcend 
individual occasions or applications.” 170  This task required a much more sustained 
consideration of language and history that the rationalist orientation of Enlightenment 
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hermeneutics allowed for, and, in turn, caused romantic thinkers to extend these 
considerations beyond the text and author to include the subjectivity of the reader as well. 
Within the history of ideas the two thinkers most often recognized as embodying 
Romantic hermeneutics are Friedrich Schleiermacher and Wilhelm Dilthey, both of 
whom—albeit in different ways—present interpretation as a reconstructive process, one 
that requires the reader to grasp the complex relationship between themselves and a 
linguistically and historically alien text. While Schleiermacher sought to create a method 
that would dispel misunderstanding by allowing the interpreter to transpose themselves 
into the mind of the author—an introspective, psychological and circular process that 
granted the interpreter the ability to divine (reconstruct) the author’s true meaning171—
the scope of Dilthey’s project was much wider.  
Dilthey saw the potential for hermeneutics to formulate the methodological basis 
of the Geisteswissenschaften (human sciences), and thus strove to create a hermeneutical 
framework free from “the reductionist and mechanistic perspective of the natural 
sciences,” 172  while also avoiding the overly introspective turn initiated by 
Schleiermacher. For Dilthey, human expression, the subject matter of the human 
sciences, “calls for an act of historical understanding” 173 —not an act of rational 
explanation—as all human expression is rooted in lived, and therefore historical, 
experience. Dilthey maintained that understanding in this domain requires a special type 
of historical consciousness, “a way of both examining and describing experiences such 
that they remain bound to the totality or comprehensiveness of our lives, including our 
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values, morals, belief, social customs, laws, etc.” 174  Despite this insight (which 
manifested as historicism), Dilthey remained firm in his epistemologically grounded 
position that a methodology that did this correctly could yield “objectively valid”175 
understandings of human expressions. The reconstructive enterprise of Romantic 
hermeneutics—with its reliance on historicism and tacit validation of the subject-object 
binary—would later face stark criticism, but it is important to emphasize that Romantic 
hermeneutics did develop two very important lines of thinking that would set the stage 
for the ontological turn in hermeneutics initiated by Heidegger and fully realized in 
Gadamer: first is  the articulation of the hermeneutical problem as being the problem of 
human understanding, and second is the acknowledgement that the subjectivity and 
sociohistorical contextualization of the interpreter—and not just the author—are 
indispensible hermeneutical considerations. 
Arguably the most influential Western philosopher of the twentieth century, 
Heidegger’s hermeneutical project involves a radical reconceptualization of the 
hermeneutical problem as the question of being.
176
 For Heidegger, this reframing of the 
question makes it clear that methodological schemas for achieving understanding occlude 
the real issue at hand—hermeneutics isn’t about “the status or content of our knowledge” 
but rather “is a question about our mode of knowing, a question about our living as 
knowers.”177 Put differently, Heidegger is interested in articulating a hermeneutics (the 
“hermeneutics of facticity”) that discloses the ontological and existential structures of the 
human being, which he refers to as Dasein, a German play on words that expresses the 
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notion that we are always already in and of the world.
178
 According to Heidegger 
understanding refers to Dasein’s fundamental relationship to the world, a “pre-
reflective” 179  and experiential connection that describes how the world is “tacitly 
intelligible”180 to us before it enters into our reflective consciousness. Interpretation, then, 
is the effort to “describe how the world becomes significant to us”181 in our reflective 
consciousness, a process Heidegger conceptualizes as being circular in nature. As 
McLean explains it:  
Heidegger’s hermeneutic circle begins when Da-sein interprets an entity in the 
world. But in order to appreciate how this entity has become significant to Da-
sein, Da-sein must turn inward and circle back to disclose its own fore-structure 
that made this present sense-event possible. Da-sein, having moved out of itself in 
apprehending an entity, returns back into itself, repeatedly, in a circular motion, 
then circles back to the entity being interpreted in successive iterations. Each 
circle provides greater insight into Da-sein’s own fore-structure, thereby allowing 
Da-sein to interpret the significance of the entity in successively different ways as 




As this passage indicates, Heidegger firmly rejects the subject-object schema so prevalent 
in Enlightenment and Romantic hermeneutics—and indeed the history of philosophy in 
general—and therefore denies that interpretation is a process that can yield objective 
truth.  
The collapsing of this binary leads Heidegger to a very interesting position on 
historical truth, one that would come to be seen as characteristic of the ontological turn in 
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hermeneutics. For Heidegger, historical meanings—far from being objectively accessible 
or valid—are meanings that are inextricably bound to the historicality and temporality of 
the interpreter: “the selection of what is to become a possible object for historiology has 
already been met with in the factical existentiell choice of Da-sein’s historicality, in 
which historiology first of all arises, and in which it is alone.”183 The accumulation of 
these insights finally leads us to Gadamer, whose hermeneutical project masterfully 
builds off the hermeneutics of the preceding two centuries to develop an original and 
compelling account of human understanding as a dialogical event.  
Exploring the implications of Gadamer’s critique of scientific knowing and concurrent 
rejection of hermeneutics-as-methodology  
 
Building off of the “breadth of the historical horizon”184 outlined by Dilthey and 
continuing Heidegger’s ontological reframing of the hermeneutical problem, Gadamer 
seeks to articulate a hermeneutics that, following Heidegger, views understanding as a 
mode-of-being, but which penetrates much more deeply into the “history of its effect.”185 
As he plainly states in Part II of Truth and Method, “Heidegger entered into the problems 
of historical hermeneutics and critique only in order to explicate the fore-structure of 
understanding for the purposes of ontology. Our question, by contrast, is how 
hermeneutics, once freed from the ontological obstructions of the scientific concept of 
objectivity, can do justice to the historicity of understanding.” 186  The critique of 
scientific knowing and concurrent rejection of hermeneutics-as-method, then, is what 
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allows Gadamer to articulate—through phenomenological analysis 187 —the radically 
fundamental connection between understanding and historicality, or, in other words, the 
insight that “understanding is never a subjective relation to a given ‘object’ but to the 
history of its effect.”188  
The notion of the “history of effect” or “effective history” is thus central to 
Gadamer’s hermeneutics, and is rooted in the Heideggarian assertion that understanding, 
as the human being’s very mode-of-being, occurs prior to the operations of our reflective 
consciousness, operations which have a tendency to want to objectify, thematize, and 
reify knowledge. Gadamer isn’t interested, therefore, in outlining a method—a tool for 
reflective consciousness—but rather in helping bring to the attention of our reflective 
consciousness the conditions of possibility that make understanding and interpretation 
(and thus all knowledge) possible.
189
 For Gadamer, effective history—and the 
concomitant phenomenon of Language—form the basis of these conditions of possibility, 
conditions which reframe the objective of knowledge in a way antithetical to “the 
scientific conception of truth.”190 Effective history, then, “is used to mean at once the 
consciousness effected in the course of history and determined by history, and the very 
consciousness of being thus effected and determined.”191 A complex concept that this 
short quote seems to deceptively simplify, effective history describes three very 
important concepts that form the foundation of Gadamer’s philosophical hermeneutics. 
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First is the notion that we are historically situated beings, that is beings whose 
very existence represents a specific temporal and historical intersection. Following from 
this is the insight that striving to achieve an Archimedean vantage point is a fruitless 
endeavor; true objectivity is impossible, because all understanding (even that in the 
natural sciences) is historically situated and therefore framed by our prejudices—the 
“pre-judgments” that stem from a) our historical situadedness (the period, culture, 
language etc., that we are born into) and b) the way that which we are encountering has 
been previously been understood in the tradition that we are a part of. Finally, and 
perhaps most crucially, Gadamer wants to point to how our consciousness is not only 
affected by this history, but in turn also adds to this history of effects, something he calls 
“historically effected consciousness.” As Nicolas Bunnin and Jiyuan Yu so concisely put 
it, “the consciousness that is affected by history, through having a pre-history, and will in 
turn effect history, through having a post-history, is called effective historical 
consciousness.”192  As these comments may suggest, Gadamer is arguing that effective 
history is “a universal element in the structure of understanding,”193 that is to say, a very 
part of our ontological make-up.  
The positivistic epistemology of the natural sciences conceals this reality by 
perpetrating the myth of the subject-object binary—a binary that denies effective history 
by affirming the idea that the prejudices of the interpreter can be bracketed away. This is 
hugely problematic for Gadamer, as he feels that “the recognition that all understanding 
inevitably involves some prejudice [is what] gives the hermeneutical problem its real 
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thrust.”194 This insight also forms the basis of his critique of Romantic historicism, as he 
believes that the Romantics—despite their scathing critique of rationalism—
“unwittingly” share in the Enlightenment’s “prejudice against prejudice itself.”195 Put 
differently, although romantic hermeneuticists understood that scientific rationalism 
represented a poor method for understanding human expression, they nevertheless 
continued to objectify history by assuming that correct method could yield objectively 
valid (and thus prejudice-free) truths.  
Gadamer is therefore interested in rehabilitating the concept of prejudice, which 
he notes did not take on a negative connotation until the Enlightenment’s preoccupation 
with rationalism. As he states, “The history of ideas shows that not until the 
Enlightenment does the concept of prejudice acquire the negative connotation familiar 
today. Actually ‘prejudice’ means a judgment that is rendered before all the elements that 
determine a situation have been fully examined.”196   While the negative connotation 
comes from the acknowledgement that these judgments may not be rooted in reason and 
therefore may be false, Gadamer emphasizes that it is important to recognize that the 
potentiality of false prejudices does not cancel out the reality and usefulness of true 
(“legitimate”) prejudices. 197  Why does Gadamer maintain that this distinction is 
important? Because he wants to demonstrate that prejudices are always present in any 
event of understanding, and thus impact the way we experience, approach, question and 
interpret all our encounters with the world—whether we acknowledge this or not. This 
stance on prejudice is rooted in Heidegger’s idea of the fore-structure of understanding, 
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the pre-reflective “experience of the world as meaningful” 198  that Dasein projects 
outward when interpreting.  
As Gadamer explains, “The process that Heidegger describes is that every 
revision of the fore-projection is capable of projecting before itself a new projection of 
meaning; rival projects can emerge side by side until it becomes clearer what the unity of 
meaning is […] The constant process of new projection constitutes the movement of 
understanding and interpretation.” 199  As all understanding and interpretation thus 
involves the fore-projection of meaning, Gadamer argues that it is crucial to acknowledge 
that prejudices are in fact what form one’s fore-structure. In other words, prejudices—
constituent elements of effective history—are that which form the “horizon” of meaning 
available to the interpreter from their unique vantage point. This is why, as we shall see, 
Gadamer’s project of rehabilitating prejudices is simultaneously a project of 
rehabilitating the authority of tradition.  
While the paradigm of the natural sciences tries to discredit the authority of 
tradition by “[subjecting] all authority to reason,” 200  Gadamer takes great pains to 
demonstrate that “our finite historical being is marked by the fact that the authority of 
what has been handed down to us […] always has power over our attitudes and 
behavior.”201 In other words, our prejudices are in fact rooted in the authority of the 
tradition of which we are a part. Acknowledging the authority of tradition should not, 
then, be viewed as some act of blind faith, but rather as a process that stems from 
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projecting various possibilities of meaning (pre-judgments) onto that which we 
encounter. Through this process, Gadamer claims, “legitimate” prejudices, those which 
aid understanding, are differentiated from the harmful prejudices that lead to 
misunderstandings. The description of how exactly this process of differentiation works 
is notoriously vague—and has opened up his rehabilitation of prejudice and tradition to 
criticism,
202—but seems to ultimately depend on the ability of both interlocutors to 
genuinely put their own position at risk, thereby exposing the prejudices that ground it.  
With regards to the current undertaking, the implications of Gadamer’s critique of 
scientific knowing and concurrent rejection of hermeneutics-as-method are manifold. The 
idea of Effective history and the rejection of the subject-object binary demonstrates why 
intercultural exchanges can be so difficult: issues of contention and instances of 
misunderstanding cannot be solved through facile appeals to method, and there is no 
“objectively valid” truth that, once reached, will validate one party and force the other to 
submit. Furthermore, as all human understanding is deeply prejudiced—that is, rooted in 
the authority of the tradition one “always already” finds themselves in—reaching an 
understanding between cultures with vast traditional divides requires adopting a stance of 
openness to the Other that seems to threaten the very self-identity of each. While at first 
glance these insights may seem to paint a rather grim outlook for success, the way that 
Gadamer conceptualizes these concepts playing out in the event understanding frames 
things in a much more positive light. 
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Philosophical Hermeneutics’ insights into the possibilities and limits of human 
communication 
 
As the discussion of effective history, prejudice and the authority of tradition 
suggests, Gadamer believes that understanding—and thus human life—occurs within 
“horizons” that provide access to various possibilities of meaning. However, as 
previously noted, not all of these possibilities of meaning are legitimate: some stem from 
harmful prejudices that need to be rooted out. According to Gadamer the act of 
differentiating between true and false prejudices “must take place in the process of 
understanding itself,”203 a process he believes begins with an experience and has the 
character of an event.
204
 Although the idea of the event is a “very ambiguous 
conception”205 in philosophy, it various usages always allude to a happening, to a state of 
affairs that is ongoing. The experiential encounter with something other than ourselves is 
thus what provokes the fore-projection of meaning, and Gadamer argues that in order to 
make the necessary differentiation between useful and harmful prejudices we must 
approach that which we encounter (be it another person or another person’s textual or 
artistic expression) “with the logical structure of openness.”206 As “the essence of the 
question is to open up possibilities and keep them open,”207 it is Gadamer’s assertion that 
“the logic of question and answer”208 is the most appropriate way to conceptualize how 
the event of understanding—which he refers to as “the fusion of horizons”209—unfolds.  
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The logic of question and answer is inherently dialogical, and this is why 
Gadamer asserts “the primacy of conversation”210  in hermeneutics. Although the main 
focus of Truth and  Method is articulating textual and not interpersonal encounters, 
Gadamer wants to demonstrate that the phenomenon of understanding (as an ontological 
function) has a universal structure that transcends all differences in application, and that 
is, at its core, dialogical. As dialogue must take place through the medium of language, 
Gadamer further insists, as Tracy puts it, that “insofar as we understand, we understand 
through language and therefore hermeneutically.”211 The basic model he offers is thus as 
follows: when we enter into an encounter with a text or another person, understanding 
occurs only if there is a genuine effort to question and be questioned; to risk allowing the 
horizon of the text or other person to enter into a dialogical relationship with our own in 
an ongoing and dynamic process that tests our prejudices.
212
 This process requires us to 
surrender ourselves to the event, and understanding—the “fusion of horizons”213—only 
occurs when we are able to permit the other’s horizon to enter into our own, opening up 
new and unforeseen horizons of possibility and meaning.
214
 Many important concepts are 
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contained in this brief description, so it will be necessary to explicate a few themes more 
closely.  
Gadamer argues that when someone encounters something they are met with “a 
polarity of strangeness and familiarity.”215 Familiarity because it must have some bond to 
us to have come into the realm of our experience,
216
 and strangeness because its 
difference addresses us in the form of a question: “Recognizing that an object is different 
[…] obviously presupposes the question of whether it was this or that.”217 If we want to 
come to understand and interpret the object of our experience rather than see it as “a tool 
that can be absolutely known and used,”218 Gadamer argues that we must maintain the 
stance of genuine openness inherent in the logic of the question; i.e., openness to the idea 
that the answer could be either this or that.
219
 As we can only experience, understand and 
interpret things from within our own horizon—“the range of vision that includes 
everything that can be seen from a particular vantage point”220—Gadamer is careful to 
emphasize that this openness is not boundless,
221
 and, furthermore, is actually indicative 
of a “radical negativity: the knowledge of not knowing.”222  As this acknowledgement of 
our finitude and the ensuing call to openness reveals, the event of understanding is not 
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something that can be controlled but rather “happens over and above our wanting and 
doing,”223 a process Gadamer likens to the way players engage in a game: 
The attraction of a game, the fascination it exerts, consists precisely in the fact 
that the game masters the players. Even in the case of games in which one tries to 
perform tasks that one has set oneself, there is a risk that they will not ‘work,’ 
‘succeed,’ or ‘succeed again,’ which is the attraction of the game. Whoever ‘tries’ 
is in fact the one who is tried. The real subject of the game (this is shown 
precisely in those experiences in which there is only a single player) is not the 
player but instead the game itself.
224
 
So, just as the willful consciousness of players in a game cannot secure the outcome of 
the game, the willful consciousness of interlocutors in a conversation cannot secure 
understanding. In other words, both sets of actors are constituent elements in an event that 
they can participate in but not control. Gadamer’s use of the concept of play is 
interesting, and helps further highlight how fundamental the idea of effective history is 
for hermeneutics.  
As beings in motion who are radically affected by and effecting history, it is 
impossible for us to achieve full self-transparency. As Tracy puts it, we are “ever-
changing.”225 What the experience of entering into dialogue with another allows for, 
however, is the opportunity “to acknowledge what is […] to have insight into the limited 
degree to which the future is still open to expectation and planning or, even more 
fundamentally, to have the insight that all expectation and planning of finite beings is 
finite and limited.”226 This fundamentally shifts the object of knowledge from “certainty” 
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to “possibility,” and thus transforms that which we encounter from “object” to “Thou.”227  
To allow the event of understanding to unfold we must acknowledge that the “Thou” is 
also a historically effected and ever-changing self, one that can we can only come to 
know through the medium of language and a process of ongoing dialogue. The dialogical 
model of human understanding, then, provides insight into the radically unstable nature 
of human understanding: all we can hope to achieve in understanding is an interpretation 
of the ways in which our discrete horizons can come together to form new possibilities of 
meaning, possibilities which in turn must themselves be tested as new experiences arise.  
It is important, however, to recognize that this instability is not synonymous with 
relativism, which Gadamer characterizes as “truth-dissolving.”228  As he states, “however 
cogent they [relativist arguments] may seem, they still miss the main point. In making use 
of them one is proved right, and yet they do not express any superior insight or value.”229 
In other words, relativist arguments avoid the hard work of putting oneself at risk, of 
trying to see how new possibilities of meaning can emerge from the bringing together of 
two discrete horizons. As relativism frames things, one is “imprisoned”230 in their horizon 
and therefore cannot hope to expand it. Philosophical hermeneutics is thus decidedly un-
relativistic, but nevertheless acknowledges that there are limits to human knowledge—
limits which force us to acknowledge our own ignorance, limits that require us to come to 
terms with any harmful prejudices we may be harboring, limits which demand that we 
come to terms with “the otherness, the indissoluble individuality of the other person.”231 
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In his later years
232
 Gadamer came to frame the significance of this finitude in religious 
terms, arguing that the experience of finitude—“the finitude beyond which we are not 
allowed to go” 233 —is best conceptualized as an experience of transcendence. The 
hermeneutical significance of this religious reframing of human finitude will be explored 
in the following section, but first I would like to offer some considerations on how the 
dialogical model of understanding, once fully explicated, can offer a much more positive 
frame of reference for intercultural and interreligious dialogue than appeared at first 
glance. 
 First is the hermeneutical imperative to approach the Others we encounter in our 
experiences of the world as “Thou”—not as objects that can be absolutely known or 
controlled. Following from this is the idea that the fusion of two discrete horizons yields 
more knowledge than can be achieved if one partner (or both) refuses to risk allowing the 
other’s point of view to question and challenge their own. Equally important is the insight 
that the event of dialogue, which requires both openness and risk taking, offers us an 
opportunity to root out the harmful prejudices that lead to misunderstandings and 
conflict. Put differently, the event of dialogue demonstrates that the risks we take by 
adopting a radical stance of openness are not without reward—even if our encounter with 
another challenges our very self-identity, the knowledge that emerges from this process 
helps us reach a greater understanding of both Self and Other. Finally, these concepts 
help further an idea that is often acknowledged but rarely taken seriously enough: truth 
                                                        
232
 From the mid-1980s until his death in 2002. 
233
 Gadamer, “Metaphysics and Transcendence” in A Century of Philosophy: Hans-Georg Gadamer in 
Conversation with Riccardo Dottori, trans. Rod Coltman and Sigrid Koepke (New York: Continuum, 
2004), 79.  
 57  
and meaning in human affairs are simply not stable and must constantly be revisited as 
we experience new perspectives.  
Transcendence, Practical Philosophy, and Critical Appraisals  
 To conclude this chapter I would like to end with a short literature review to 
contextualize my project within the larger body of existing Gadamerian scholarship on 
philosophical hermeneutics and inter-cultural/religious understanding. As will soon be 
apparent, this literature review will also act to address the final concerns framing this 
chapter, namely Gadamer’s concept of transcendence-as-finitude and his insistence that 
philosophical hermeneutics continues the tradition of practical philosophy. In English-
language scholarship that explores the usefulness of applying philosophical hermeneutics 
in this way, there seems to be three different strands of discourse: (1) those who 
conceptualize the relationship between philosophical hermeneutics and inter-
cultural/religious understanding in purely textual terms, and who argue that it either does 
or does not aid in the cross-cultural/religious understanding of texts from different 
religions and cultures
234
; (2) those (and these voices are decidedly in the minority) who 
seem to accept Gadamer’s ontology as a “way of living” 235  that facilitates the 
understanding of “geographically, culturally, and religiously” 236  different Others; (3) 
those who argue—albeit in different ways and with different points of focus—that 
Gadamer’s hermeneutics offers a valuable resource for scholars trying to comprehend 
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what inter-cultural/interreligious understanding actually entails: what its end goals are, 
how to make sense of the challenges that arise, what type of conditions help facilitate it. 
Thinkers who fall under this last category do not fully accept the universality of 
Gadamer’s claims, but do maintain that philosophical hermeneutics nevertheless contains 
valuable resources in this regard. This last strain is where I would like to situate my own 
efforts, and so I will begin by examining three prominent examples of this approach as 
found in the work of David Tracy, Fred Dallmayr, and Jens Zimmerman. 
In “Western Hermeneutics and Interreligious Dialogue,” David Tracy argues that 
“the most persuasive model for interpretation-hermeneutics remains the Gadamerian 
hermeneutical model,”237 and, furthermore, that an exploration of this model’s strengths 
and weaknesses acts to “clarify certain central aims of  modern interreligious 
dialogues.”238  In explaining his position Tracy is careful to emphasize that the nature of 
Gadamer’s hermeneutical project is descriptive and not prescriptive: “It is important to 
note that despite many misreadings of his position, Gadamer is not presenting a 
methodology for dialogue […] As [he] makes clear over and over again, he is presenting 
a philosophical not methodological analysis of dialogue as constituted by a peculiar 
questioning, to-and-fro movement.” 239  Tracy argues that while we shouldn’t accept 
Gadamer’s ontological description completely or unreservedly, it does offer a useful 
framework for conceptualizing understanding as an inherently dialogical process, which, 
in turn, frames the central aim of inter-cultural/religious dialogue as the desire to 
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understand and be understood—not merely to “exchange viewpoints.” 240  He further 
argues that the main strength of Gadamer’s model is the way it clarifies “what dialogue is 
and what it is not,”241 and, following from this, the way it sheds light on the “basic limits 
[of] hermeneutical-dialogical understanding.”242 He identifies and outlines three aspects 
of Gadamer’s thought he feels are indispensable in this regard. First is how effective 
history and the primacy of language offer “a strong acknowledgement of the finitude and 
historicality of all human understanding.”243 Second is how the logic of question and 
answer frames our partners in dialogue as “genuine other[s], not […] projected 
other[s].”244 Third is how Gadamer’s concept of play frames dialogue as something that 
can’t be fully controlled by either party: “each self must ‘let go’ to the dialogue itself.”245  
Tracy also maintains, however, that interreligious dialogue often faces certain 
challenges that Gadamer’s model doesn’t seem to adequately address—namely, the 
presence of prejudices rooted in systematic distortions (racism, sexism, classism, 
xenophobia, etc.). As he states, “I do not believe Gadamer ever fully grasped the radical 
difference between conscious error and unconscious distortion.”246 In other words, while 
Gadamer’s model may offer a fairly convincing description of how the “to-and-fro” of 
question and answer can expose and dispel certain prejudices (those stemming from “pre-
conscious”247 attitudes that the event of dialogue makes conscious through the process of 
question and answer) this description doesn’t seem to be as convincing or useful when 
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one suspects they are facing prejudices rooted in systematic distortions. The fact that the 
latter often present themselves as hindrances to inter-cultural/religious understanding, 
Tracy argues, demonstrates “the need, at crucial dimes in dialogue, for the interruption of 
dialogue by various hermeneutics of suspicion” 248—the act of pausing dialogue (for 
however long necessary) to see if the application of certain critical theories can expose 
and “treat”249 these prejudices so dialogue can proceed.250  
In “Hermeneutics and Intercultural Dialogue: Linking Theory and Practice,” Fred 
Dallmayr argues that Gadamer’s philosophical hermeneutics offers an “antidote” to the 
“overly pessimistic and debilitating” view that “cross- or inter-cultural hermeneutics [is] 
impossible or futile.” 251  The areas of Gadamer’s thought he highlights as being 
particularly “antidotal” are: (1) Gadamer’s insistence that philosophical hermeneutics 
continues the Aristotelian tradition of ‘practical philosophy;’ (2) his description of the 
event of understanding as a “fusion of horizons.” As ontology, philosophical 
hermeneutics makes the assertion that understanding-as-interpretation is the mode of 
being underlying all lived experience. Practical philosophy makes the assertion that lived 
experience (praxis) and the ability to exercise free choice (prohairesis) represent the 
basis for ethics.
252
 According to Dallmayr, by making the claim that philosophical 
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hermeneutics “belongs in the neighborhood of practical philosophy”253 Gadamer is, on 
the one hand, articulating the ethical dimension of hermeneutics, and, on the other, 
making a claim that clarifies the type of social context that best facilitates inter-
cultural/religious understanding. Explaining this may require a bit of back tracking. 
Practical philosophy, as just noted, holds that ethical choices arise in social contexts that 
allow for the ability to exercise free choice,
254
 and Dallmayr argues that Gadamer is 
making a similar claim about hermeneutics:  
As Gadamer indicates, [hermeneutical] application cannot really happen in a 
society or political regime where norms or rules of conduct are entirely static and 
exempt from further interpretation, that is, where there is a ban on creative 
exegesis and transformation […] Hermeneutics, for Gadamer, hence presupposes 
a constitutional regime (perhaps a democratic constitutional order) which does not 
rely on arbitrary decisions or willful domination and which makes room for the 
hermeneutical balancing of ‘whole and parts’ and the dialogical inquiry into the 




This knowledge is “antidotal” for Dallmayr, because it asserts that genuine inter-
cultural/religious understanding is not an impossible or lost cause—it is possible, but this 
possibility is contingent on context (a context that allows for debate, deliberation and free 
choice).   
While some scholars reject the idea that the “fusion of horizons” represents an 
appropriate description of the event of understanding—arguing that it seems to depict an 
assimilatory process that denies the alterity of the other—Dallmayr contends that this is a 
superficial understanding of Gadamer’s position: the fusion of horizons isn’t, as Gadamer 
puts it, “naïve assimilation,”256 but rather “an unlimited openness to horizons […] in such 
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a matter that interpretive understanding can never by fully stabilized or completed.”257 
The fact that the fusion of horizons presents understanding as an “infinite process”258 
demonstrates that this process depends upon the inviolability of the Other, as the Other’s 
alterity is the very challenge to the Self that keeps the process going.
259
 Dallmayr asserts 
that this insight is significant for inter-cultural/religious dialogue because it acts to 
assuage fears that the outcome of such dialogue must inevitably end in misunderstanding 
(Samuel Huntington’s “clash of civilizations thesis” 260 ), problematic assimilation, or 
“condoning everything.”261 As he states, “the point of inter-cultural encounter is not to 
reach a bland consensus or uniformity of beliefs but to foster a progressive learning 
process involving possible transformation […] the point is to achieve a shared 
appreciation and recognition of difference.”262  
Of particular interest to the discussion at hand is how Dallmayr explicitly relates 
the fusion of horizons to the thought of Charles Taylor. Dallmayr states that Taylor’s 
thought is “friendly” 263  to Gadamer’s hermeneutics, and asserts that his argument 
regarding the politics of recognition helps “flesh out and corroborate”264 the idea that 
inter-cultural/religious hermeneutical understanding is indeed possible and not inevitably 
destined to end in misunderstanding, assimilation, or an attitude of complete 
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permissiveness.
265
 Briefly summarized, the principle of recognition refers to the notion 
that the self-identity and self-dignity of a person or community of people is shaped by 
dialogical relationships with others, others who either recognize the unique identity of the 
individual or group, withhold recognition, or misrecognize.
266
 According to Taylor, 
certain expressions of pluralism (namely multiculturalism) try to deny this principle by 
asserting that a stance of “difference blindness”267  is actually what allows people of 
different cultures and religions to peacefully coexist. This stance is problematic for 
Taylor, because “difference blindness” demands, as a right, “actual judgments of equal 
worth applied to different customs, and creations of […] different cultures,”268 in a way 
he argues discourages people from doing the hard work of actually engaging with other 
cultures and being genuinely moved to make the judgment or not. As the ethical 
dimension of hermeneutical understanding is rooted in praxis and prohairesis, the 
judgment of value that stems from this demand is forced and therefore not “dictated by a 
principle of ethics.” 269  This, in turn, also reaffirms Gadamer’s assertion about the 
significance of context for facilitating inter-cultural/religious dialogue and understanding.   
Jens Zimmerman focuses on a aspect of Gadamer’s thought that neither Tracy or 
Dallmayr explicitly consider: his notion of transcendence. In both “Ignoramus: 
Gadamer’s ‘Religious Turn’” and “The Ethics of Philosophical Hermeneutics and the 
Challenge of Religious Transcendence,” Zimmerman evaluates Gadamer’s claim—made 
most famously in Die Lektion des Jahrunderts but also discussed in a number of his later 
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interviews
270—that “the pressing task of philosophy is to prepare a dialogue between the 
world religions by discovering in each one a moment of the ‘great chain we call 
transcendence’”271 For Gadamer, the concept of transcendence describes the experience 
of a radical limit to our knowing subjectivity (our finitude) and the simultaneous 
experience of an excess beyond this limit. It is the ignoramus in Plato’s account of 
Socrates—“the knowledge of not-knowing.”272 He believes this experience is a universal 
aspect of the human condition, and argues that it is something that is inextricably linked 
with our experience of alterity: “the actual meaning of our finitude or thrownness consists 
not only in the awareness that we are historically conditioned [Bedingtheit] but in our 
awareness of being delimited by the other.”273 While religion defines this experience 
through positive theology—i.e., through various dogmas—Gadamer argues that a 
negative definition of this experience (the refusal to thematize it) results in a stance of 
radical openness towards the Other that “opens the way up to the true superiority of 
questioning,”274 and thus to the possibility of genuine understanding. Zimmerman argues 
that this particular framing of transcendence is also closely linked with Gadamer’s belief 
that philosophical hermeneutics continues the tradition of practical philosophy: “what 
sets Gadamer’s notion of transcendence apart from mere philosophical speculation is his 
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insistence that it cannot be theoretical but must be genuinely experienced.”275 Gadamer’s 
argument regarding the significance of transcendence thus asserts that the universal 
experience of transcendence-as-finitude (conceptualized in negative terms) compels us to 
adopt and maintain the radical stance of openness we need to meet the Other with if we 
hope to let the dialogical event of understanding between religions and cultures unfold 
ethically.  
While Zimmerman’s offers a sympathetic portrayal of Gadamer’s position, he 
ultimately argues that it is deeply flawed. By asking religious individuals to experience 
transcendence in negative rather than positive terms, “Gadamer asks a large percentage of 
humanity to forgo […] the very thing that defines their humanity, their particular beliefs, 
for humanity’s sake,” 276  which, in turn, contradicts the “ethos of learning from the 
other” 277  that characterizes philosophical hermeneutics. In other words, Zimmerman 
argues that it’s impossible to see how Gadamer’s notion of transcendence is even a 
remotely viable way of approaching task at hand—Gadamer can’t even describe the 
experience in adequately negative terms himself, as what he is articulating is a “neo-
Platonic logos”278 rooted in a “Greek cosmology.”279 He concludes by asserting that the 
concept’s primary value lies in demonstrating the “historically effected limitations”280 of 
philosophical hermeneutics itself.  
Taking Zimmerman’s critique to its logical conclusion, I maintain that this notion 
of transcendence in fact demonstrates the soundness of many other aspects of Gadamer’s 
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position and highlights their applicability to inter-cultural/religious understanding. 
Gadamer can’t see the problematic nature of his own notion of transcendence because he 
hasn’t truly opened himself up to the idea that his own cosmology is just one possibility 
of meaning among many. When he says, regarding this notion, that “There is only this 
solution left. There is no other,” 281  he reveals that he is not letting the event of 
understanding unfold as he himself says it must, and is instead trying to secure 
understanding through his own willful consciousness. The fact that this notion fails to 
resonate with even a sympathetic audience (Zimmerman) poignantly demonstrates how 
difficult it is to become conscious of one’s own prejudices, and how inter-
cultural/religious understanding thus does seem to truly require, on the one hand, 
sustained dialogical encounters with alterity, and, on the other, a radical stance of 
openness to this alterity, to the point that one is willing to let themselves be taken over by 
the event and potentially have their own horizon of meaning (and thus understandings of 
Self and Other) transformed. 
The theoretical considerations put forward by these three thinkers clearly frames 
philosophical hermeneutics as a valuable resource for making sense of many of the 
difficulties surrounding inter-cultural/religious understanding, while at the same time 
acknowledging its limitations in this regard. My aim in the following chapter, then, is to 
argue that the true value of applying philosophical hermeneutics in this way lies in seeing 
how these insights hold up in relationship to a concrete event—can the Quebec 
accommodation crisis, taken as a case study, reveal obstacles to inter-cultural/religious 
dialogue and understanding that have been overlooked by these positions? Can it open 
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the door to thinking of any new or different ways Gadamer’s thought might lend itself to 
this endeavor? Will it confirm all of these insights or prove some of them to be faulty? 
Will it affirm the idea that the motivation behind inter-cultural/religious dialogue is the 
desire to understand and be understood (to be recognized), or will it demonstrate that the 
politicization of this dialogue has alerted the underlying motivation? With these questions 
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Chapter III 
 
Accommodation via Understanding 
 
As outlined in the preceding chapter, Gadamer is making the claim that human 
understanding is a dialogical event that happens “over and above our wanting and 
doing”282—not something that can be consciously willed or forced into existence by some 
facile appeal to method. Keeping this important distinction in mind, it will now be time to 
turn to the central aim of the present inquiry: a pointed investigation of the ways in which 
philosophical hermeneutics’ framing of human understanding can shed light on—and, in 
doing so, perhaps act to alleviate—some of the factors hindering intercultural dialogue 
and understanding in the Quebec context. The accommodation crisis offered a window 
into these factors, which, according to my analysis in Chapter One, can be summarized 
under three broad categories: (1) anxiety over identity; (2) the presence of harmful 
prejudices (some of which are rooted in a lack of information and exposure to the Other, 
others in what Tracy has labeled “systemic distortions”); (3) misunderstandings regarding 
secularism and interculturalism, which, by extension, also encompasses 
misunderstandings regarding pluralism and the harmonization practices it necessitates.  
 
Anxiety Over Identity 
As argued in Chapter One, a close examination of the Quebec Charter of Values 
and the findings of the Bouchard-Taylor Commission suggests that anxiety over identity 
is a major obstacle to intercultural dialogue and understanding in Quebec. This anxiety 
over identity is perhaps best conceptualized as a deep concern regarding the viability of 
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achieving the delicate balance interculturalism strives for: while the Québécois majority 
is anxious about ensuring that the contemporary reality of pluralism does not hinder the 
survival and flourishing of their social imaginary, Quebec’s various ethnocultural and 
religious minorities are anxious about maintaining their own social imaginaries in a 
context which demands they reconceptualize their self-understanding to account for their 
new status as Quebecers. In Gadamerian terms, both sides are concerned over the fact 
that coming to understand the Other unavoidably entails a risk to one’s Self-
understanding. Unpacking this in relation to the accommodation crisis will require a 
reexamination of some of Gadamer’s central claims. Before beginning my examination, 
however, I would like to note that as the Bouchard-Taylor report and the Charter of 
Values both primarily focus on the anxiety of the majority, the focus of my discussion 
largely will follow suit.
283
 
One of the central aims of philosophical hermeneutics is to articulate the 
historically effected character of all human understanding.
284
 As humans are embodied 
creatures embedded in a specific historical context (and thus cultural and linguistic 
tradition), the way we view the world is thus always already colored by the authority of 
this context—we simply cannot assume some objective vantage point that will allow us 
to bracket away the “pre-judgments” (prejudices) that stem from this basic frame of 
reference. What philosophical hermeneutics asks us to recognize, then, is that the 
existence of these pre-judgments is not, as the paradigm of the natural sciences would 
have us believe, an obstacle to understanding, but rather “a universal element in the 
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structure of understanding.”285 Put differently, these pre-judgments are what we project 
onto the people and things we encounter to make sense of them; they are constituent 
elements of our horizon. However, as emphasized in Chapter Two, “the prejudices and 
fore-meanings that occupy the interpreter’s consciousness are not at his free disposal. He 
cannot separate in advance the productive prejudices that enable understanding from the 
prejudices that hinder it […] [T]his separation must take place in the process of 
understanding itself.”286 The universality of prejudices and our inability to bracket them 
away does not mean that we are imprisoned by the delimitation they represent—that we 
can’t think or understand otherwise—but rather that we depend on the challenge of 
alterity to transcend this delimitation, and herein lies the element of risk.  
As Gadamer frames things, when someone encounters another person (or another 
person’s textual or artistic expression), understanding only occurs if they can relinquish 
their desire to try and control the situation, if they acknowledge that “the other must be 
experienced not as the other of myself grasped by pure self-consciousness, but as a 
Thou.”287  Experiencing the other as Thou, Gadamer explains, requires us to adopt a 
stance of genuine openness: “we cannot stick blindly to our own fore-meaning about the 
thing if we want to understand the meaning of another […] All that is asked is that we 
remain open to the meaning of the other person or text.”288 In other words, we have to let 
the Other “really say something to us.”289 Opening oneself up in this way, however, can 
be perceived as a distinctly risky endeavor. Why? Because by entering into a dialogical 
relationship with this Other and relinquishing our desire to control the event we are 
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opening ourselves up to the possibility of fusing our horizon with theirs—something with 
transformative implications. 
As Gadamer explains it, “to reach an understanding in a dialogue is not merely a 
matter of putting oneself forward and successfully asserting one’s point of view, but 
being transformed into a communion in which we do not remain what we were.”290 This 
transformation doesn’t mean that we have reached a “perfect agreement over the subject 
matter”291 by assimilating ourselves with the Other and thereby effacing the difference 
between us. What it does mean, rather, is that by following the logic of question and 
answer—“with all the necessary conflicts, ruptures and discordance”292—we have truly 
opened ourselves up to the possibility that meaning exists beyond our own horizon, to the 
idea that the Other’s point of view is meaningful and that their difference, to use Taylor’s 
terminology, deserves recognition. The fusion of horizons, then, transforms our self-
understanding by revealing that “we are not a self-sufficient source of meaning.”293 As 
the transformative potential of dialogue thus indicates, understandings of Self and Other 
are simply not stable: coming to an understanding is “an infinite process.”294 This means 
that the understandings people have about themselves and their society (and their place in 
it) are subject to change, which, while perhaps easy to acknowledge in the abstract, can 
be deeply unsettling when actually experienced—as the accommodation crisis 
demonstrates. 
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From a Gadamerian standpoint, the anxiety over identity in Quebec can be read as 
an implicit acknowledgement that individual and collective understandings are 
constructed in relationship to Others, and that the existence of diversity represents a 
challenge to the impulse to control the way this construction takes shape. However, if we 
accept Gadamer’s framing of things it becomes clear that in coming to an understanding 
with another we simply cannot have the control we desire. To understand the Other we 
must open ourselves up to them, a gesture which, if genuine, indicates that we have 
relinquished our desire for control and come to terms with dialogue’s transformative 
implications. What philosophical hermeneutics further reveals, however, is that 
transformation is not erasure: when something is transformed what was there endures, 
but in a new form. As Gadamer puts it, “Even where life changes violently […] far more 
of the old is preserved in the supposed transformation of everything than anyone knows, 
and it combines with the new to create a new value.” 295  According to my own 
interpretation of things, this insight into the nature of transformation can act to alleviate 
some of the anxiety under discussion. 
As Bouchard and Taylor frame it, Quebec’s anxiety over accommodation is 
rooted in the belief that the principle of accommodation represents a risk to the collective 
identity of the founding culture. According to the Oxford English Dictionary, risk can be 
defined as “exposure to the possibility of loss.” 296  However, the type of loss many 
members of the majority seem to associate with the accommodation of alterity is a 
permanent loss, not a transformation (where what is “lost” is still preserved, albeit in a 
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new form). Think back to the language used by Bouchard in Interculturalism as he details 
the erroneous perceptions of interculturalism rooted in cultural anxieties—he states that 
one such perception holds that “the promotion of a shared culture will smother the 
founding culture.”297 While the word “smother” can mean “to overwhelm” it can also 
mean “to kill,” “to extinguish.” The use of this type of language is not isolated. 
Throughout the Bouchard-Taylor report the word “survival” is used sixteen times in 
reference to the majority’s identity related anxieties, in phrases such as: “[Quebec is] 
constantly worried about its future if not survival;”298 “A concern for survival has been a 
hallmark of this [Quebec’s] past;”299 “the constant battles it [Quebec] must wage for its 
[the French language’s] survival.”300 Furthermore, Bouchard and Taylor also note that a 
small but notable portion of the majority invoked the “scenario of inevitable 
disappearance”301 when articulating their criticisms of accommodation. While “survival” 
can mean to continue, persist, or endure, it can also mean to “remain alive,”302 and, 
furthermore, the sense of “disappearance” invoked by the phrase above indicates “to 
cease to be present, to depart; to pass from existence.”303  
While the connotations of this language thus reveal a fear that openness to the 
other (a precondition for dialogue and understanding) represents an existential threat, 
philosophical hermeneutics suggests the opposite, that openness to the other nourishes 
existence: “To become always capable of conversation—that is, to listen to the Other—
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appears to be to be the true attainment of humanity.”304 The transformations precipitated 
by dialogical understanding are thus not life-threatening but rather life-giving. Put 
differently, philosophical hermeneutics asks us to recognize that our very being-in-the-
world is a journey that inescapably involves Others: we are who we are because of the 
Others we encounter, and the ways we engage with and understand these encounters. As 
the construction of identity is thus “ever changing,”305 transformation is not something 
that should be feared—it is a part of our very ontological make-up. This is something that 
Bouchard and Taylor themselves try to emphasize. As they state,  
We now know that collective entities are not essences or immutable characters 
that appear to navigate on the surface of time. Instead, they are constructions that 
are forged in history from the experience of communities [….] The past of the 
French identity in Québec is an eloquent example: first Canadian, then French-
Canadian, then Quebecer; first confined to the Laurentian Valley, then extended 
across Canada and again confined to Québec; defined for a long time exclusively 
with reference to culture, i.e. mainly language and religion, then released from 
this latter component to open itself up to the political, social and economic fields, 
and ultimately, penetrated by pluralism. However, all of these transformations do 




As this emphasis on continuity-in-transformation indicates, Quebecers—but particularly 
the Québécois majority—need not be so fearful that the legacy of the Quiet Revolution 




As a constituent element of the majority’s historically effected consciousness—or, 
put differently, their collective horizon—this aspect of Quebec history and the values it 
represents cannot be ignored or erased, but rather must be engaged with. In other words, 
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if Quebec’s ethnocultural and religious minorities hope to come to an understanding with 
the Québécois majority, they must open themselves up to the idea that these fundamental 
aspects of the Québécois collective identity are meaningful and deserve recognition. 
However, as the discussion regarding the Charter of Values indicates, this process cannot 
be forced. If, through legal recourse, Quebec demands that ethnocultural and religious 
minorities recognize these values by renouncing important aspects of their own identity, 
intercultural dialogue—the desire to understand and be understood—cannot occur.  
Gadamer’s emphasis on the necessity of language for dialogue can also act to 
assuage existential fears,
308
 in this case those surrounding the idea that pluralism will 
undermine the primacy of the French language in public life. As noted in Chapter Two, 
Gadamer’s assertion about the primacy of conversation in understanding is 
simultaneously an assertion about the ontological primacy of language. In other words, if 
understanding (our mode of being) is inherently dialogical it is also inherently lingual.
309
 
Language, then, is the medium that allows for “the freedom of ‘expressing oneself’ and 
‘letting oneself be expressed.’” 310  As Wierciński puts it, “The fusion of horizons 
happening in the event of understanding is accomplished by language. Language is 
constantly present in our interaction with one another (Im Miteinander).” 311  The 
acknowledgement of the primacy of language in all human understanding, then, 
demonstrates that in the Quebec context, the primacy of the French language cannot be 
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undermined: it is the foundation, the starting point, the very possibility for all attempts at 
intercultural understanding in this context.  
These insights into the ways in which Gadamer’s thought can clarify and assuage 
certain aspects of Quebec’s identity related anxieties—a major obstacle to intercultural 
understanding in this context—thus clearly supports Dallmayr’s claim that philosophical 
hermeneutics offers an “antidote” to overly pessimistic or debilitating views regarding 
the viability of intercultural understanding. I would now like to move on to discuss the 
issue of harmful prejudices and the misunderstandings they give rise to. According to 
Gadamer the event of dialogue is a sufficient means of brining these prejudices to light 
and dispelling them, and, in the following section, I aim to evaluate this claim in light of 
the accommodation crisis.  
 
Prejudice, Misunderstanding and the Event of Dialogue 
Gadamer’s project of rehabilitating prejudice and the authority of tradition is 
rooted in the central claim of philosophical hermeneutics: the idea that understanding, 
(experience plus dialogue), is medial; that it is “always already mediated by the saying of 
others or tradition.”312 When Gadamer states “The true locus of hermeneutics is this in-
between,” 313  he is thus asserting that understanding isn’t rooted in the logic of the 
demonstrable statement (which assumes the possibility of achieving an Archimedean 
vantage point) but rather in the logic of the question born out of the experience of 
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openness to alterity.
314
 It is necessary, then, to rehabilitate the concept of prejudice, 
because prejudices represent the “referents of human understanding”315—without them 
how can we question or be questioned? Gadamer doesn’t deny the existence of harmful 
prejudices, and explicitly acknowledges that “it is the tyranny of hidden prejudices that 
makes us deaf to what speaks to us.”316  
When Gadamer states that a person trying to understand “cannot separate in 
advance the productive prejudices that enable understanding from the prejudices that 
hinder it” and that “this separation must take place in the process of understanding 
itself,”317 he is asserting that we can only become aware of our prejudices (both good and 
bad) through the event of dialogue; through opening ourselves up to the other and 
allowing their prejudices to question our own in an ongoing and dynamic process. In 
other words, before our prejudices are thrown into question by the Other’s alterity we 
cannot become aware of them. Differentiating between which prejudices are harmful and 
which are productive is also dependent on the event of understanding. As dialogical 
understanding frames meaning not as “rigid concept” but rather as “possibility,” what 
Gadamer seems to be suggesting is that what allows us identify the presence of harmful 
prejudices is whether or not we can achieve a fusion of horizons. As Maria Luisa 
Portocarrero puts it in “The Role of Prejudice in Gadamer’s Understanding of Language 
as Dialogue,” false prejudices are “those which close themselves up to dialogue and 
understanding.”318 What this means, then, is that no prejudice is inherently harmful—it 
only becomes harmful if we refuse to allow it to be questioned and thus are prevented 
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from opening ourselves up to the possibilities of meaning present in the horizon of the 
Other (and thus from achieving the “genuine human bond”319).  
 As noted in Chapter Two this description is highly abstract and somewhat vague, 
and so I would like to try and apply these insights to the accommodation crisis to see how 
this description holds up in reference to a concrete event (and, in doing so, evaluate the 
usefulness of this notion in reference to intercultural dialogue). A major component of the 
Bouchard-Taylor Commission was the hosting of public forums where members of the 
public from all walks of life could come together and express themselves freely. Based 
on the descriptions of the public forums contained in the final report, it seems safe to 
assert that these forums were not characterized by a fusion of horizons. Although 
Bouchard and Taylor describe the forums as having a “warm, cordial atmosphere,”320 I’d 
like to examine the words they use to describe the interactions that took place. They say 
the forums provided a space for people to “express their opinions;” 321  “debate;” 322 
“defend themselves;”323  “express very deep concerns or, indeed, anxieties.” 324  While 
these characterizations don’t appear to reflect dialogical understanding as described by 
Gadamer, prejudices—both good and bad—were nevertheless exposed (but, as we shall 
see, not necessarily dispelled). While the ability of the majority to express their “deep 
seated attachment to the legacy of the Quiet Revolution” 325  revealed constructive 
prejudices (i.e., the notions of gender equality, secularism and the primacy of the French 
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language), the presence of “offensive remarks […] targeted mainly at Muslims” 326 
revealed negative prejudices (xenophobia, racism). Does this mean that Gadamer’s 
framing of things is incorrect? 
Although the members of the public who expressed themselves in the public 
forums didn’t appear to have reached a fusion of horizons, it would be hard to defend the 
position that no dialogue occurred here. In this sense, Gadamer’s claim that we can only 
become aware of our prejudices (both good and bad) through dialogue seems to be 
confirmed. Dialogue did occur during the public forums, and through this both productive 
and harmful prejudices were revealed. However, as what occurred here cannot be 
characterized as a fusion of horizons it is not possible to look to these forums to confirm 
or deny Gadamer’s claim that the fusion of horizons—openness to and recognition of the 
Other’s meaning—is able to somehow dispel all types of harmful prejudice.  
However, what about Bouchard and Taylor themselves? Is it possible to assert 
that they were able to fuse their horizons with the concerned parties at the center of the 
crisis? That in doing so they dispelled a number of harmful prejudices? I believe this can 
be asserted—when one keeps in mind that the fusion of horizons doesn’t signal 
finality
327—and, furthermore, that the comparison between their response and the Charter 
of Values demonstrates this. The Bouchard-Taylor report not only seems to acknowledge 
that “we cannot have experiences without asking questions,”328 but also that answering 
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the questions provoked by the experience of pluralism requires a fundamental openness 
to the horizons of the majority and minorities. Furthermore, they acknowledge that their 
take on things cannot be conceptualized as all-encompassing—that is, they indicate their 
awareness that coming to an understanding of the issues at the center of the crisis must be 
conceptualized as an on-going effort. Finally, the report demonstrates that the dialogue 
they engaged in with members of the majority and various minorities did dispel certain 
harmful prejudices: not only do they dispel the notion that requests for religious 
accommodation are harmful, they also dispel many factual misconceptions surrounding 
the notions of open secularism and interculturalism, thus beginning the process of 
dispelling prejudices rooted in the fear of cultural erasure, which, as they state, “ha[ve] 
no future.”329 
The Charter of Values, however, as a legal document, sets out assertions of 
meaning in the form of regulations which deny that other possibilities of meaning could 
be valid, and, in doing so, confirms the two harmful prejudices: (1) that religious 
accommodation poses a threat to the Québécois majority; (2) that there is reason to fear 
ethnocultural and religious Others on the basis of their otherness. Furthermore, as 
Bouchard argues in Interculturalism, since “it has now been confirmed” that the PQ 
government “conducted no research whatsoever prior to engaging in this major 
imitative,”330 it is clear that that dialogue did not occur between the PQ and ethnocultural 
and religious minorities. This, then, seems to confirm Gadamer’s claim that harmful 
prejudices—and misunderstandings—thrive in the absence of dialogical understanding 
(the fusion of horizons). As Bouchard notes, 
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Despite the outcome of the provincial election [which resulted in the shelving of 
Bill 60] it will not be easy to repair the major damage that has been caused. One 
negative effect has been the demonization of religious symbols, particularly the 
hijab. Another is the anti-immigrant sentiment that has been aroused. A third is 
the rift that has been created in Quebec society between the francophone majority 




This statement by Bouchard thus seems to confirm Dallmayr’s claim that Gadamer’s 
move to link philosophical hermeneutics with practical philosophy clarifies the type of 
social context that best facilitates inter-cultural/religious dialogue and understanding. As 
the Charter of Values, if passed, would have denied certain religious minorities the ability 
to exercise free choice (prohairesis) it seems clear that this type of social context would 
not be conducive to facilitating intercultural dialogue and understanding.  
 The application of Gadamer’s thought to Quebec’s accommodation crisis has thus 
indeed demonstrated that philosophical hermeneutics is a useful framework for 
approaching the pressing issue of intercultural dialogue and understanding. It confirms 
Gadamer’s insistence that philosophical hermeneutics cannot be contained in some 
theoretical silo, but is, rather, something with intimately practical dimensions that call out 
to be applied. However, applying Gadamer’s thought in this way isn’t without its 
challenges, and I am not claiming that philosophical hermeneutics has the ability to shed 
light on or alleviate all of the obstacles to intercultural understanding raised by the 
accommodation crisis. As noted in the preceding chapter, Tracy argues that Gadamer 
doesn’t seem to be able to grasp the difference between harmful prejudices rooted in a 
“pre-conscious” lack of information (for example, the idea that accommodation was 
undesirable because it granted minorities special privileges) and those stemming from 
“systemic distortions” (prejudices such as racism and xenophobia that are rooted much 
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more deeply into one’s psyche). The analysis provided above does not refute this claim—
Bouchard and Taylor were not able to dispel the prejudices rooted in systemic 
distortions—and in concluding I aim to evaluate Tracy’s suggestion that the way to 
address the presence of prejudices rooted in systemic distortions is not, as Gadamer 
asserts, by continued dialogue, but rather by pausing dialogue to see if the application of 
certain critical theories can expose and “treat” these prejudices so dialogue 
(understanding) can proceed. While it will be beyond the scope of this paper to explore 
this assertion in any real detail, I will suggest that Paul Ricoeur’s insistence on the need 
for more critical reflection in hermeneutics is an avenue that could be taken up further in 
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Conclusion 
I began this inquiry with a simple assertion: that there is value in applying 
Gadamer’s philosophical hermeneutics to a case study on inter-cultural/religious dialogue 
and understanding. While the link between Gadamer’s thought and the realm of 
intercultural dialogue is fairly well established in Gadamerian scholarship, my own  
exploration into these themes asks, with Gadamer, that we acknowledge that 
hermeneutics is application; that a purely theoretical discussion on the relationship 
between philosophical hermeneutics and intercultural understanding does not truly put 
these themes into dialogue with one another. As philosophical hermeneutics asserts that 
we must enter into dialogue with that which we wish to understand—be it another person 
or another person’s textual or artistic expression—the present inquiry has asserted that a 
case study accomplishes this in a way the theoretical discussions put forward by Tracy, 
Dallmayr and Zimmerman simply cannot.  
I maintain that this is because if we take the notion of effective history 
seriously—as well as the attendant notions of prejudice, authority and tradition—then we 
see, as Gadamer puts it in Truth and Method, that “the very idea of a [hermeneutical] 
situation means that we are not standing outside it and hence are unable to have any 
objective knowledge of it […] throwing light on it is a task that is never entirely 
finished.”332 In other words, inter-cultural dialogue and understanding is not something 
that can be objectified and understood from a distance. Rather, it is something that occurs 
between embodied humans rooted in specific historical and cultural contexts, which 
means that coming to understand what facilities and hinders this activity must be 
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approached in reference to a specific hermeneutical situation. Again, hermeneutics 
(understanding) is application. By applying Gadamer’s thought to the accommodation 
crisis, then, a number of important insights come to light.  
The notion of effective history and the rehabilitation of prejudice and the authority of 
tradition can clarify and assuage the intense anxiety surrounding the legacy of the Quiet 
Revolution and the survival of the majority’s social imaginary. Clarify, because it helps 
explain this anxiety, assuage, because it confirms that this history cannot be discarded or 
silenced: it is a constitutive element of the Québécois social imaginary and provides the 
horizon of meaning available to the majority. Gadamer’s assertions regarding the primacy 
of language in all understanding can also act to assuage Québécois fears that pluralism 
will undermine the primacy of the French language in public life—it is highly improbable 
that the primacy of the French language will be undermined, because it represents a 
fundamental condition of possibility for all intercultural understanding in this context. 
Finally, the logic of question and answer helps assuage one of the accommodation crisis’ 
most divisive issues—risk; the idea that accommodating ethnocultural/religious Others 
will result in the majority’s cultural and linguistic erasure.  As Gadamer takes pains to 
demonstrate, the transformations that occur as the result of entering into dialogue with 
Others should be embraced not feared. Why? Because self-understandings (both 
individual and collective) are simply not stable or static entities. Put differently, human 
identities are ever-changing, ever-evolving, and are created in relationship to Others. In a 
word, they are dialogical.
333
 This means that these transformations are an inescapable 
reality of living in community with Others. As Wierciński states in “The Primacy of 
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Conversation,” “Hermeneutic conversation makes us aware that what we need most on 
our journey toward-understanding via the otherness of the other is change.”334 To try and 
fight this reality by refusing to enter into dialogue with Others—as we saw with the 
Charter of Values—is to traverse a dangerous path.   
However, as indicated in the preceding chapter, while philosophical hermeneutics 
may indeed, as Dallmayr asserts, be viewed as an antidote to the overly pessimistic view 
that intercultural dialogue simply isn’t viable,335 it should not be viewed as some final 
cure-all (as Gadamer’s argument regarding transcendence in Die Lektion des Jahrunderts 
seems to suggest
336
). According to Tracy, one of the biggest challenges posed to 
intercultural dialogue and understanding is the presence of prejudices rooted in “systemic 
distortions,” which he argues is something Gadamer’s model fails to adequately account 
for. Drawing from the insights of Paul Ricoeur and others,
337
 Tracy thus suggests, in 
conflict with Gadamer, that dialogue alone may not be a sufficient means of brining to 
light and dispelling such deeply rooted prejudices; that perhaps dialogue must be 
periodically interrupted by a “hermeneutics of suspicion” if it wishes to adequately 
address the presence of such systemic distortions. As Tracy states,  
Paul Ricoeur does not reject the basic Gadamerian model of conversation in 
hermeneutics while, at the same time, arguing for the use of all relevant 
explanatory methods (e.g. structuralist, semiotic, historical-critical, formal, 
aesthetic, etc.) to challenge or to correct one’s initial understanding of the other 
by showing how certain structures and other linguistic, social, cultural, economic, 
religious, or historical networks […] can be decoded through the use of the 
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relevant method, not to replace (as Gadamer fears) but to enrich the final 








 As Ricoeur asserts in “Hermeneutics and the Critique of Ideology,” 340  the 
Gadamer-Habermas debate seems to frame the  “fundamental gesture of philosophy”341 
as an either-or: “either a hermeneutical consciousness or a critical consciousness.”342  
However, according to Ricoeur, the “fundamental gesture of philosophy” need not be 
framed in such polarized terms—both impulses can be accommodated, but in order to do 
this the hermeneutics of tradition needs some “critical supplementation.” 343  While 
Ricoeur offers four suggestions,
344
 the one Tracy is referencing is his second, which 
states that philosophical hermeneutics “must overcome the ruinous dichotomy inherited 
from Dilthey, between ‘explanation’ and ‘understanding’ [which] arises from the 
conviction that any explanatory attitude is borrowed from the methodology of the natural 
sciences and illegitimately extended to the human sciences.”345 According to Ricoeur, 
then, Gadamer—in his move to decisively disentangle hermeneutics from the 
objectifying paradigm of the natural sciences—seems to erroneously frame all 
explanation as “naturalistic.” 346   As Ricoeur argues, semiotics demonstrates that all 
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explanation is not rooted in the paradigm of naturalism,
347
 which frees up critical 
explanation for use in hermeneutics. The main point is that Ricoeur’s model is one of 
“understanding-explanation-understanding” 348 —when one suspects that dialogue and 
understanding are being hindered by the presence of prejudices rooted in “systemic 
distortions” such as racism or xenophobia, dialogue must be interrupted to see if critical 
explanation can work to fully expose and this distortion and, in doing so, “treat”349 it.350  
 I believe Ricoeur’s suggestion is valuable, and draws attention to an important 
lacuna in Gadamer’s thought: in trying to rehabilitate prejudice and the authority of 
tradition Gadamer seems to have failed to remember that just as the rehabilitation of these 
notions is valid, so too is the move to critique them. However, all things considered, I do 
not believe that this insight invalidates Gadamer’s central claims, but rather supports the 
idea that understanding is an infinitely dialogical process: philosophical hermeneutics 
itself is an understanding born out of a series of dialogical encounters, and, as such, is not 
a closed event but rather something that must itself stay open to being transformed by 
dialogical encounters with others such as Ricoeur. As Gadamer himself states in Truth 
and Method, “Even the most genuine and pure tradition does not persist because of the 
inertia of what once existed. It needs to be affirmed, embraced, cultivated.”351 
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